Under-connected and over-connected networks
Abstract
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically are the sources of inefficiency. We approach this gap by analyzing the role of positive and negative externalities of link formation. We find general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be "too dense" in a well-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities, tend to induce "too dense" networks.Download Info
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Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 400.Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:400
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Related research
Keywords: networks; network formation; connections; game theory; externalities; spillovers; stability; efficiency;Other versions of this item:
- Tim Hellmann & Berno Buechel, 2009. "Under-connected and Over-connected Networks," Working Papers 2009.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Berno Buechel & Tim Hellmann, 2012. "Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 71-87, March.
- Tim Hellmann & Mathias Staudigl, 2012. "Evolution of Social networks," Working Papers 470, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
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