Equilibrium Refinement in Perturbed Games and in Sender- Receiver Games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 92-13.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
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game theory ; economic models ; economic equilibrium;
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- Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1992. "On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 992, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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