Cheap talk, Efficiency and Egalitarian Cost Sharing In Joint Projects
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Date of creation: 04 Nov 2005
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- Agastya, Murali & Menezes, Flavio & Sengupta, Kunal, 2007. "Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-19, July.
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-09 (All new papers)
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