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The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict

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Author Info

  • Sandeep Baliga
  • Tomas Sjostrom

Abstract

Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An "extremist," who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements). (JEL D74, D82)

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2897
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 102 (2012)
Issue (Month): 6 (October)
Pages: 2897-2922

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:6:p:2897-2922

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 11-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  2. Sidartha Gordon & Alessandro Riboni, 2014. "Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior," Sciences Po publications 2014-08, Sciences Po.
  3. Efraim Benmelech & Claude Berrebi & Esteban Klor, 2010. "Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions," NBER Working Papers 16493, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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