Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior
AbstractThis paper studies a game of conflict where two individuals fight in order to choose a policy. Intuitively, conflicts will be less violent if individuals entertain the possibility that their opponent may be right. Why is it so difficult to observe this attitude? To answer this question, this paper considers a model of indoctrination where altruistic advisors (such as, preachers or parents), after receiving signals from Nature, send messages to the participants in the conflict. In some cases, as a result of indoctrination, both individuals never doubt about the possibility of being wrong, although all available information suggests otherwise. In other cases, one of the two individuals is excessively reasonable: he believes that the opponent may be right even when all the evidence indicates beyond any doubt that the policy preferred by the opponent is suboptimal. The common feature in both cases is that information is distorted, although in different directions. The model has a rich set of predictions concerning the incidence and intensity of conflict, and the evolution of indoctrination strategies over time.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2010 Meeting Papers with number 296.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2009.
"The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict,"
Departmental Working Papers
200906, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992.
"Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction,"
9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998.
"Caps on Political Lobbying,"
- Markus K. Brunnermeier & Jonathan A. Parker, 2004.
NBER Working Papers
10707, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brunnermeier, Markus K & Parker, Jonathan A, 2004. "Optimal Expectation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jonathan Parker & Markus K Brunnermeier, 2002. "Optimal Expectations," FMG Discussion Papers dp434, Financial Markets Group.
- Jonathan A. Parker & Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2004. "Optimal Expectations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 426, Econometric Society.
- Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2007.
"Social Capital as Good Culture,"
Economics Working Papers
ECO2007/57, European University Institute.
- Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2007. "Social Capital as Good Culture," NBER Working Papers 13712, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Guiso, Luigi & Sapienza, Paola & Zingales, Luigi, 2008. "Social Capital as Good Culture," CEPR Discussion Papers 6657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dessi, Roberta, 2008. "Collective Memory, Cultural Transmission and Investments," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Ellingsen, Tore, 1991.
"Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 648-57, June.
- Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2010. "Social Memory, Evidence, and Conflict," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(3), pages 559-574, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.