Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict

Contents:

Author Info

  • Sandeep Baliga

    () (Northwestern)

  • Tomas Sjostrom

    () (Rutgers)

Abstract

Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by "extremists" who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions are strategic complements, a "hawkish extremist" can increase the likelihood of conflict by sending messages which trigger a "fear-spiral" of hawkish actions. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If actions are strategic substitutes, a "dovish extremist" (pacifist) can send messages which cause one decision-maker to back down and become more dovish. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. The hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision-makers if actions are strategic substitutes, and the pacifist is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: ftp://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/2009-06.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 200906.

as in new window
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 28 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200906

Contact details of provider:
Postal: New Jersey Hall - 75 Hamilton Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248
Phone: (732) 932-7482
Fax: (732) 932-7416
Web page: http://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/rutgers-wplist.html
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: global strategy;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons., 1988. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Economics Working Papers 8863, University of California at Berkeley.
  2. Matthews, Steven A, 1989. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 347-69, May.
  3. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2003. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000766, David K. Levine.
  4. Benmelech, Efraim & Berrebi, Claude & Klor, Esteban F., 2010. "Economic Conditions and the Quality of Suicide Terrorism," CEPR Discussion Papers 7995, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. David A. Jaeger & Esteban Klor & Sami Miaari & Daniele Paserman, 2008. "The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada," HiCN Working Papers 52, Households in Conflict Network.
  6. Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, 2003. "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 119-144, Fall.
  7. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  9. Jaeger, David A. & Paserman, Daniele, 2005. "The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," IZA Discussion Papers 1808, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Berman, Eli & Laitin, David D., 2008. "Religion, terrorism and public goods: Testing the club model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1942-1967, October.
  11. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Strategic Information Transmission through the Media," MPRA Paper 5556, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007.
  12. Jaeger, David A & Paserman, Marco Daniele, 2006. "Israel, the Palestinian Factions and the Cycle of Violence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Claude Berrebi & Esteban Klor, 2004. "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Working Papers 859, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  14. Farrell, J. & Gibbons, R., 1989. "Cheap Talk With Two Audiences," Working papers 518, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  15. Laurence Iannaccone & Eli Berman, 2006. "Religious extremism: The good, the bad, and the deadly," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 109-129, July.
  16. Efraim Benmelech & Claude Berrebi, 2007. "Attack Assignments in Terror Organizations and The Productivity of Suicide Bombers," NBER Working Papers 12910, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Claude Berrebi, 2003. "Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians," Working Papers 856, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  18. Claude Berrebi & Esteban F. Klor, 2008. "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism?: Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate," Working Papers 477-1, RAND Corporation Publications Department.
  19. Jaeger, David A. & Paserman, Daniele, 2007. "The Shape of Things to Come? Assessing the Effectiveness of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings," IZA Discussion Papers 2890, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  20. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x.
  21. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  22. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2006. "Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001247, UCLA Department of Economics.
  23. Kydd, Andrew & Walter, Barbara F., 2002. "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(02), pages 263-296, March.
  24. Eli Berman, 2003. "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias," NBER Working Papers 10004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sj�str�m, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369.
  26. Farrell, J. & Gibbons, R., 1989. "Cheap Talk With Two Audiences," Working Papers e-89-7, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
  27. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 2007. "Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(01), pages 9-36, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," EIEF Working Papers Series 1110, Einaudi Institute for Economic and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2011.
  2. Alessandro Riboni, 2010. "Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior," 2010 Meeting Papers 296, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Efraim Benmelech & Claude Berrebi & Esteban Klor, 2010. "Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions," NBER Working Papers 16493, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1802, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
  5. Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 11-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200906

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.