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Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information

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  • Ying Chen

    (Arizona State University)

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    Abstract

    But when a policy dimension and a distributive dimension are both present, we show that in equilibrium, the demands by the legislators have some influence on the bargaining outcome but they are not fully informative about the legislators' true preferences. We characterize equilibria under the majority rule and show that equilibrium demands by the legislators can be either cooperative, compromising or tough.

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    File URL: http://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2010/paper_1159.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2010 Meeting Papers with number 1159.

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    Date of creation: 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:red:sed010:1159

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
    2. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap talk can matter in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 221-237, June.
    3. Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2009. "The evaluation of majority rules in a legislative bargaining model," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 674-684, December.
    4. Juan J. Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Bargaining with commitments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 129-144, January.
    5. Takahashi, Satoru & Ambrus, Attila, 2008. "Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces," Scholarly Articles 3200263, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    6. Yves Breitmoser, 2009. "Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 183-191, June.
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