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On Majoritarian Bargaining With Incomplete Information

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  • Tsung‐Sheng Tsai
  • C. C. Yang

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Suggested Citation

  • Tsung‐Sheng Tsai & C. C. Yang, 2010. "On Majoritarian Bargaining With Incomplete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(4), pages 959-979, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:51:y:2010:i:4:p:959-979
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00607.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. , & ,, 2014. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    2. Eraslan, Hülya & McLennan, Andrew, 2013. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2195-2222.
    3. repec:awi:wpaper:0709 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Tsung-Sheng Tsai & C. Yang, 2010. "Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(2), pages 345-361, February.
    5. Vincent Anesi, 2018. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making under Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers 2018-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    6. Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose," Working Papers 111211, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    7. repec:awi:wpaper:0679 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Louis-Sidois, Charles & Musolff, Leon Andreas, 0. "Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    9. Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai, 2010. "Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies," Working Papers 2072/151549, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    10. Jan Zápal, 2017. "Crafting consensus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 169-200, October.
    11. Peter Bils & William Spaniel, 2017. "Policy bargaining and militarized conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 647-678, October.
    12. Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai, 2015. "A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 465-480.
    13. Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hülya, 2013. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1309, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    14. Ma, Zizhen, 2023. "Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    15. Winschel, Evguenia, 2012. "Coalition formation for unpopular reform in the presence of private reputation costs," Working Papers 13-08, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    16. Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose," Working Papers 111211, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.

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