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Bargaining with commitments

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  • Juan Vidal-Puga

    (University of Vigo)

Abstract

We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which each player puts a prize to his resources before leaving the game. The only expected final equilibrium payoff can be defined by means of selective marginal contributions vectors, and it coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover, for 3-player games the selective marginal contributions vectors determine the core when it is nonempty.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0306/0306002.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0306002.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 24 Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0306002

Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on HP; pages: 19 ; figures: none
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: demand commitment game bargaining;

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References

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  1. Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
  2. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
  3. Fershtman, C. & Kalai, E., 1993. "Unobserved Delegation," Papers 10-93, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
    • Fershtman, Chaim & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Unobserved Delegation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 763-74, November.
  4. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1996. "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 134-152, April.
  5. Helmut Bester & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Delegated Bargaining and Renegotiation," ESE Discussion Papers 61, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  6. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-37, May.
  7. Moldovanu, Benny & Eyal Winter, 1993. "Core Implementation and Increasing Returns to Scale for Cooperation," Discussion Paper Serie B 289, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1992. "Revocable Commitment and Sequential Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 378-87, March.
  9. Bennett, E. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games," Papers 9062, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  10. Selten,Reinhard, . "A demand commitment model of coalition bargaining," Discussion Paper Serie B 191, University of Bonn, Germany.
  11. Harold Houba & Wilko Bolt, 1997. "Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 57-77.
  12. Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo, 2003. "An implementation of the Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 412-427, August.
  13. (*), Y. Stephen Chiu & Ani Dasgupta, 1998. "On implementation via demand commitment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 161-189.
  14. Winter, Eyal, 1994. "The Demand Commitment Bargaining and Snowballing Cooperation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 255-73, March.
  15. Corts, Kenneth S. & Neher, Darwin V., 2003. "Credible delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 395-407, June.
  16. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1997. "Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 825-51, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ju, Y. & Wettstein, D., 2006. "Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: A Generalized Bidding Approach," Discussion Paper 2006-42, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hülya, 2013. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1309, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  3. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," Economics Working Paper Archive 563, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  4. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2005. "Efficient Bidding with Externalities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 641.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2011. "Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives," MPRA Paper 33613, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Breitmoser, Yves, 2011. "Binomial menu auctions in government formation," MPRA Paper 28576, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Ying Chen, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2011. "Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 395-408, March.
  10. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0511005, EconWPA.
  11. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2013. "Reference dependent altruism in demand bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 127-140.
  12. Yves Breitmoser, 2009. "Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 183-191, June.
  13. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2012. "A Violation of Monotonicity in a Noncooperative Setting," Discussion Papers 2012-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

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