Coordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1301.
Date of creation: Aug 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2001-02-14 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gary Charness, 1998.
"Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture,"
Economics Working Papers
293, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Charness, Gary B, 1998. "Pre-Play Communications And Credibility: A Test Of Aumann'S Conjecture," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt01j786tj, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Charness, Gary, 2000. "Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 177-194, November.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997.
"The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . ""The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers ed504c985fc375cbe719b3f60, Penn Economics Department.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 113-128, November.
- Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1203, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Calvert, Randall L., 1992. "A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 347-372, July.
- Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982.
"Strategic Information Transmission,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
- Farrell Joseph, 1993.
"Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
- Farrell, Joseph, 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4968n3fz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- J. Farrell, 2010. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap Talk Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 533, David K. Levine.
- Joseph Farrell., 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Economics Working Papers 8609, University of California at Berkeley.
- Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
- Y. G. Kim & J. Sobel, 2010. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Levine's Working Paper Archive 374, David K. Levine.
- Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sobel, Joel, 1995.
"An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication,"
Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1181-93, September.
- Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August.
- Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.