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• Paulo Klinger Monteiro
• Flavio Marques Menezes

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 493-514
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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:35:y:2001:i:4:p:493-514

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2. LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques & MARTIMORT, David, 2004. "The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries," IDEI Working Papers 267, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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