This paper offers a new type of explanation for economic institutions as playing the role of mediators in the sense of Myerson (1985) to facilitate communication in contracting settings with ex ante asymmetric information and limited commitment. It derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which mediation is strictly helpful and provides a straightforward, yet general intuition for this result. As an application of our idea we explain the widely observed use of consultants during the restructure of firms.
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Paper provided by Departmental Working Papers in its series Papers with number
005.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988.
"The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-75, September.
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Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2004.
"Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment,"
Discussion Papers
24, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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