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Optimal Auctions with General Distributions

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  • Vasiliki Skreta

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/skreta/OG.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 843644000000000227.

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Date of creation: 22 Jul 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000227

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms," UCLA Economics Online Papers 342, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2006. "Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 293-299, May.
  4. Vasiliki Skreta, 2006. "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 1085-1111.
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Cited by:
  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Vasiliki Skreta, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000176, David K. Levine.

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