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Dynamic Common Agency

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Author Info
Dirk Bergemann
Juuso Valimaki

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Abstract

We consider a general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria and characterize theequilibrium set for a refinement of the Markov perfect equilibria. Particular attention is given to the existence of a marginal contribution equilibrium where each principal receives her contribution to the coalition of agent and remaining principals. The structure of the intertemporal payoffs is analyzed in terms of the flow marginal contribution. As a by-product, new results for the static common agency game are obtained. The general characterization results are then applied to two dynamic bidding games for a common agent: (i ) multi-task allocation and (ii ) job matching under uncertainty.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1259.

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Date of creation: Nov 1998
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1259

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Related research
Keywords: Common agency dynamic bidding marginal contribution markov perfect equilibrium coalition-proof equilibrium job matching multi-task allocation

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 1996. "Learning and Strategic Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1125-49, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. G. Bellettini & G. Ottaviano, 1999. "Special Interests and Technological change," Working Papers 340, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Chiara Fumagalli & Michele Polo, . "Buyer Power and Quality Improvement," Working Papers 310, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide & Martimort, David, 2004. "Common agency with informed principals," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 551, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2007. "Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1616, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Kirchsteiger, G. & Prat, A., 1999. "Common agency and computational complexity : theory and experimental evidence," Discussion Paper 36, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1394, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2008. "The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002340, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Paul Schweinzer, 2001. "Bilateral Uncertainty in a Model of Job-Market Screening with Intermediaries," Game Theory and Information 0108002, EconWPA, revised 08 Jan 2002. [Downloadable!]
  9. Olivier Cadot & Lars-Hendrik Röller & Andreas Stephan, 2002. "Contribution to Productivity or Pork Barrel? The Two Faces of Infrastructure Investment," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Melvyn G. Coles & Jan Eeckhout, 2000. "Heterogeneity as a Coordination Device," Economics Working Papers 510, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  11. V. Bhaskar & Ted To, 2002. "Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An Analysis of Free Entry," Economics Discussion Papers 537, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2006. "Efficient Dynamic Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1584, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  13. V. Bhaskar & Ted To, 2000. "Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An Analysis of Free Entry Equilibria," Industrial Organization 0004011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Uk Hwang & Francesco Magris, 2005. "Intergenerational Conflicts and the Resource Policy Formation of a Short-Lived Government," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 141(III), pages 437-457, September. [Downloadable!]
  15. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2003. "Dynamic Price Competition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1412, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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