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Competition in Loan Contracts

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Author Info
Christine A. Parlour
Uday Rajan
Abstract

We present a model of an unsecured loan market. Many lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts (a debt level and an interest rate) to a borrower. The borrower may accept more than one contract. Her payoff if she defaults increases in the total amount borrowed. If this payoff is high enough, deterministic zero-profit equilibria cannot be sustained. Lenders earn a positive profit, and may even charge the monopoly price. The positive-profit equilibria are robust to increases in the number of lenders. Despite the absence of asymmetric information, the competitive outcome does not obtain in the limit.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 91 (2001)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1311-1328
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:5:p:1311-1328

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gropp, Reint & Scholz, John Karl & White, Michelle J, 1997. "Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 217-51, February.
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  3. Ausubel, Lawrence M, 1991. "The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 50-81, March.
  4. Brito, Dagobert L & Hartley, Peter R, 1995. "Consumer Rationality and Credit Cards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(2), pages 400-433, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bizer, David S & DeMarzo, Peter M, 1992. "Sequential Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 41-61, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mester, Loretta J, 1994. "Why Are Credit Card Rates Sticky?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 505-30, May.
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  8. Broecker, Thorsten, 1990. "Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 429-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. McAfee R. Preston, 1995. "Multiproduct Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 83-105, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Jaynes, Gerald David, 1978. "Equilibria in monopolistically competitive insurance markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 394-422, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1989. "Default And Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model Of Debt," Working papers 520, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  14. Ilya Segal, 1998. "Contracting with Externalities," Public Economics 9802002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. White, Michelle J, 1989. "The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 129-51, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Yaron Leitner, 2005. "A theory of an intermediary with nonexclusive contracting," Working Papers 05-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  2. Reich, S., 2007. "Robust Incentives," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0729, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  3. Piero Gottardi & Alberto Bisin & Adriano Rampini, 2007. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," Working Papers 2007_24, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Yaron Leitner, 2009. "Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary," Working Papers 09-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  5. Agar Brugiavini & Gwenaël Piaser, 2006. "Non-exclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market," Working Papers 2006_39, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Andrea Attar & Nicolas Porteiro & Gwenaël Piaser, 2006. "A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard," Working Papers 2006_36, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Yaron Leitner, 2004. "Non-Exclusive Contracts, Collateralized Trade, and a Theory of an Exchange," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 397, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  8. ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa & PIASER, Gwena‘l, 2005. "Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market," CORE Discussion Papers 2005031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Khalil, Fahad & Martimort, David & Parigi, Bruno, 2004. "Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting," IDEI Working Papers 321, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  10. repec:bep:thecon:v:6:y:2006:i:1:p:1253-1253 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Bennardo, Alberto & Pagano, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2009. "Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing," CEPR Discussion Papers 7186, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Han, Seungjin, 2006. "Strongly Robust Equilibrium and Competing-Mechanism Games," Micro Theory Working Papers han-06-01-19-06-37-40, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Yaron Leitner, 2003. "Non-exclusive contracts, collateralized trade, and a theory of an exchange," Working Papers 03-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  14. Doris Neuberger, 2005. "What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm," Finance 0503001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Fahad Khalil & David Martimort & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2005. "Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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