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Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts

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Author Info
Bisin, Alberto
Guaitoli, Danilo

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Abstract

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard (hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium is determined by the interaction of financial intermediaries. The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is that intermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: the agents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot be monitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In this set-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive-constrained inefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity is that the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimal action. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts do implement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits and equilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definition of third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture the non-exclusivity of contracts).

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1987.

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Date of creation: Oct 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1987

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Related research
Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Efficiency; exclusivity;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
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  3. Bisin, Alberto & Gottardi, Piero, 1999. "Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 1-48, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Heski Bar-Isaac & Vicente Cuñat, 2005. "Long Term Debt with Hidden Borrowing," Economics Working Papers 803, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Yaron Leitner, 2005. "A theory of an intermediary with nonexclusive contracting," Working Papers 05-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon, 2006. "On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," PSE Working Papers 2006-51, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  4. Tano Santos & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2001. "Financial Intermediation without Exclusivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 436-439, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Reich, S., 2007. "Robust Incentives," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0729, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  6. Piero Gottardi & Alberto Bisin & Adriano Rampini, 2007. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," Working Papers 2007_24, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Andrea, ATTAR & Eloisa, CAMPIONI & Gwena‘l, PIASER, 2005. "Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005024, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Yaron Leitner, 2009. "Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary," Working Papers 09-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  9. OZERTURK, Saltuk, 2006. "Hedge markets for executives and corporate agency," CORE Discussion Papers 2006009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  10. Matthias Blonski & Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, 2008. "Excess Returns and the Distinguished Player Paradox," cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 78, cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany)., revised 27 Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
  11. T. Santos & J. Scheinkman, 2000. "Competition Among Exchanges," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s12, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    Other versions:
  12. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & Francois Salanie, 2009. "Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons," Working Papers 09.13.289, LERNA, University of Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Alberto Bennardo & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2003. "Bertrand and Walras Equilibria Under Moral Hazard," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000748, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Gwenael Piaser, 2005. "Stochastic and deterministic menus in common agency games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(11), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  15. Alberto Bennardo & Marco Pagano & Salvatore Piccolo, 2008. "Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing," CSEF Working Papers 211, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Andrea Attar & Nicolas Porteiro & Gwenaël Piaser, 2006. "A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard," Working Papers 2006_36, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000445, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Luca Panaccione, 2007. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1358-1358. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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