Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals

Contents:

Author Info

  • Larry Wall
  • Robert Eisenbeis

Abstract

The debate over modernizing the financial structure is raising questions about the merits of modernizing the financial regulatory structure. Regulatory structure is important because an almost unavoidable feature of our current system of government is that Congress assigns multiple goals that sometimes have conflicting policy implications to the regulatory agencies. The structure of the agencies is important to the resolution of these conflicts. Responsibility for two or more goals that have conflicting implications may be assigned to a single agency that is likely to resolve the conflict with a consistent set of policies based on the agency's priorities. Alternatively, the goals may be assigned to more than one agency, an action that often results in the conflicts being debated in the public arena but that may also result in the agencies' implementing inconsistent policies. This paper uses the problem of goal conflicts to provide a framework for evaluating alternative regulatory structures.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1008144526251
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Financial Services Research.

Volume (Year): 16 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 223-245

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:223-245

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102934

Related research

Keywords: regulatory structure; financial services;

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Edward J. Kane, 1985. "The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262611856, December.
  2. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  3. R. Alton Gilbert, 1988. "A comparison of proposals to restructure the U.S. financial system," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 58-75.
  4. Edward Kane, 1997. "Ethical Foundations of Financial Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 51-74, August.
  5. Edward J. Kane, 1984. "Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition Among the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies," NBER Working Papers 1331, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Alan Greenspan, 1995. "Financial innovations and the supervision of financial institutions," Proceedings 435, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  7. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  8. Larry D. Wall, 1997. "Taking note of the deposit insurance fund: a plan for the FDIC to issue capital notes," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 1, pages 14-30.
  9. Persons, John C., 1997. "Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring Costs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 269-306, October.
  10. Kane, Edward J., 1980. "Politics and Fed policymaking : The more things change the more they remain the same," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 199-211, April.
  11. Kane, Edward J, 1996. "De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(2), pages 141-61, May.
  12. Edward J. Kane, 1988. "Changing incentives facing financial-services regulators," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 265-279.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Larry D. Wall, 2010. "Prudential Discipline for Financial Firms: Micro, Macro, and Market Structures," Working Papers id:3040, eSocialSciences.
  2. Robert Eisenbeis & W. Frame & Larry Wall, 2007. "An Analysis of the Systemic Risks Posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and An Evaluation of the Policy Options for Reducing Those Risks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 75-99, June.
  3. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
  4. Wall, Larry D., 2012. "Central Banking for Financial Stability: Some Lessons from the Recent Instability in the United States and Euro Area," ADBI Working Papers 379, Asian Development Bank Institute.
  5. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2009. "Multinational Banking and Regulatory Challenges: Lessons from the US Experience with AIG," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(2), pages 13-18, 07.
  6. Joseph A. Clougherty, 2004. "Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global Context," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  7. Kane, Edward J., 2000. "Capital movements, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 153-175, May.
  8. Edward J. Kane, 2001. "Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethicsof Financial Regulation," NBER Working Papers 8399, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Edward Kane, 2000. "Architecture of Supra-Governmental International Financial Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 301-318, December.
  10. Edward Kane, 1999. "How Offshore Financial Competition Disciplines Exit Resistance by Incentive-Conflicted Bank Regulators," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 265-291, December.
  11. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  12. Kane, Edward J., 2000. "The dialectical role of information and disinformation in regulation-induced banking crises," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 8(3-4), pages 285-308, July.
  13. Larry D. Wall, 2012. "Central banking for financial stability Some lessons from the recent instability in the US and euro area," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 8(3), pages 247-280, August.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:223-245. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.