Financial Supervision Structure In Romania. A Comparative Approach
AbstractIn this paper we assess the financial supervision and regulation structure inRomania. To this purpose, we calculate and interpret the Financial Supervision UnificationIndex (FSU Index) and the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA) at the level ofthe year 2011 (August), according to Masciandaro‘s methodology (2004) for all EU27member countries in order to make comparisons with the Romanian ones. We propose achange in the present Romanian financial supervisory regime from the silos model to a hybridone, arrangement that supposes a combination of the sectoral model with the objectives-centred model.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia in its journal Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica.
Volume (Year): 2 (2011)
Issue (Month): 13 ()
Contact details of provider:
central bank; financial stability; Romanian financial supervision and regulation structure; the FSU Index; the CBFA Index;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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