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Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms

In: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't

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Randall S. Kroszner
Philip E. Strahan
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This chapter was published in: Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, , pages 233-272, 2001.

This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 10762.

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This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
Frederic S. Mishkin, 2001. "Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number mish01-1.
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, 1981. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Public Regulation, pages 1-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Marianne P. Bitler & Alicia M. Robb & John D. Wolken, 2001. "Financial services used by small businesses: evidence from the 1998 survey of small business finances," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Apr, pages 183-205. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Abrams, Burton A & Settle, Russell F, 1993. " Pressure-Group Influence and Institutional Change: Branch-Banking Legislation during the Great Depression," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 687-705, December.
  7. Charles W. Calomiris & Eugene N. White, 1994. "The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 145-188 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  8. King, Robert G. & Levine, Ross, 1993. "Finance and growth : Schumpeter might be right," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1083, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Flannery, Mark J., 1984. "The social costs of unit banking restrictions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 237-249, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Allen N. Berger & Anthony Saunders & Joseph M. Scalise & Gregory F. Udell, 1998. "The Effects of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions on Small Business Lending," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 98-007, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
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  13. Strahan, Philip E. & Weston, James P., 1998. "Small business lending and the changing structure of the banking industry1," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 821-845, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bronars, Stephen G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 317-50, October.
  15. Gilligan, Thomas W & Marshall, William J & Weingast, Barry R, 1989. "Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 35-61, April.
  16. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-63, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Kahn, Matthew E & Matsusaka, John G, 1997. "Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 137-73, April.
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  19. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Thomas Romer & Barry R. Weingast, 1991. "Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle," NBER Chapters, in: Politics and Economics in the Eighties, pages 175-214 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  21. Winston, Clifford, 1993. "Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1263-89, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Bender, Bruce & Lott, John R, Jr, 1996. " Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 67-100, April.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Laeven, Luc, 2004. "The political economy of deposit insurance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3247, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Vasso Ioannidou & Jan de Dreu, 2006. "The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline," DNB Working Papers 089, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. David R. Skeie, 2008. "Banking with nominal deposits and inside money," Staff Reports 242, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Claire Giordano, 2009. "Prudential Regulation and Supervision Instruments and Aims: A General Framework," Conference Papers giordano, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3849, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Kris James Mitchener, 2006. "Are Prudential Supervision and Regulation Pillars of Financial Stability? Evidence from the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 12074, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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