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Agency problems and goal conflicts Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Robert A. Eisenbeis
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Agency theory is used to evaluate how the European Union (EU) may deal with the resolution of goal and agency conflicts in dealing with failing financial institutions. Experience in the United States suggests that the financial and regulatory structure being put in place, which relies upon country-sponsored deposit insurance funds and home country responsibility for supervision and lender-of-last-resort functions, is not likely to be robust to the failure of a large EU institution that threatens the solvency of the deposit insurance fund or that poses systemic risk. The author concludes that the EU needs a centralized and common approach to dealing with troubled institutions.
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its series Working Paper with number
2004-24.
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Keywords: References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Other versions:
Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998.
"Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees ,"
CRSP working papers
349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
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[Downloadable!] Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, .
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[Downloadable!]
Armen Hovakimian & Edward J. Kane & Luc Laeven, 2002.
"How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting ,"
NBER Working Papers
9322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Hovakimian, Armen & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2002.
"How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting ,"
CEI Working Paper Series
2002-10, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
[Downloadable!] Armen Hovakimian & Edward Kane & Luc Laeven, 2003.
"How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting ,"
Journal of Financial Services Research ,
Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 177-204, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Robert A. Eisenbeis & Larry D. Wall, 2002.
"Reforming deposit insurance and FDICIA ,"
Economic Review ,
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[Downloadable!]
J.G. Rotte & M.P.H. de Vor, 2001.
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Research Series Supervision (discontinued)
36, Netherlands Central Bank, Directorate Supervision.
[Downloadable!]
Kane, Edward J, 1977.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Edward J. Kane, 1988.
"Changing incentives facing financial-services regulators ,"
Proceedings ,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 265-279.
Edward J. Kane, 1987.
"Who should learn what from the failure and delayed bailout of the ODGF? ,"
Proceedings ,
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86, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
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Pacific-Basin Finance Journal ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Holopainen, Helena, 2007.
"Integration of financial supervision ,"
Research Discussion Papers
12/2007, Bank of Finland.
[Downloadable!]
Santiago Carbo-Valverde & Edward J. Kane & Francisco Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2008.
"Evidence of Differences in the Effectiveness of Safety-Net Management in European Union Countries ,"
NBER Working Papers
13782, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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