Bankruptcy law and large complex financial organizations: a primer
AbstractLarge complex financial organization (LCFOs) are exposed to multiple problems when they become insolvent. They operate in countries with different approaches to bankruptcy and, within the U.S., multiple insolvency administrators. The special financial instruments that comprise a substantial portion of LCFO assets are exempted from the usual "time out" that permits the orderly resolution of creditor claims. This situation is complicated by the opacity of LCFIs' positions, which may make them difficult to sell or unwind in times of financial crisis. This article discusses these issues and their origins.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its journal Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): (2003)
Issue (Month): Q I ()
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