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How Do Firms Choose Their Lenders? An Empirical Investigation

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Author Info
Miguel Cantillo (University of California, Berkeley)
Julian Wright (University of Canterbury, New Zealand)

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Abstract

This article investigates which firms borrow directly from the capital markets and which raise funds through intermediaries. Our empirical results show that large companies with abundant cash and collateral tap the credit markets directly. These markets cater to safe and profitable industries, and are most active when riskless rates or intermediary earnings are low. We show that determinants of lender selection sharpen during investment downturns and that there are substantial asymmetries in the way firms enter and exit capital markets. These results support a theoretical framework where intermediaries have better reorganizational skills but a higher cost of capital than bondholders

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Finance with number 9803007.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 30 Mar 1998
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:9803007

Note: approx 40 pages
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Besanko, David & Kanatas, George, 1993. "Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 213-32. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-91, August.
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  16. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. " Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-400, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 1998. "Deposits and relationship lending," Working Papers 98-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Simon H. Kwan & Willard T. Carleton, 2004. "Financial contracting and the choice between private placement and publicly offered bonds," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 2004-20, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
  3. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 1998. "Deposits and Relationship Lending Review of Financial Studies," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-03, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  4. Morgado, Artur & Pindado, Julio, 2001. "Selección de proveedores y tipos de fondos: Teoría y evidencia empírica con datos de panel," Documentos de Trabajo "Nuevas Tendencias en Dirección de Empresas". Working Papers "New Trends on Business Administration". 2001-13, Interuniversitary Doctorate Program "New Trends on Business Administration", Universities of Valladolid, Burgos and Salamanca (Spain). Programa de Doctorado Interuniversitario "Nuevas Tendencias en Di. [Downloadable!]
  5. Galina Hale & João A. C. Santos, 2006. "Evidence on the costs and benefits of bond IPOs," Working Paper Series 2006-42, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
  6. Raphael H. Solomon, 2005. "Pocket Banks and Out-of-Pocket Losses: Links between Corruption and Contagion," Working Papers 05-23, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jandik, Tomas & Makhija, Anil K., 2005. "The Impact of the Structure of Debt on Target Gains," Working Paper Series 2005-5, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Throwing Good Money after Bad? Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-12, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  9. Alan Morrison, 2000. "Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation and Investment Decisions," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe01, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  10. Tobias Miarka & Michael Tröge, 2005. "Do bank-firm relationships reduce bank debt? Evidence from Japan," European Journal of Finance, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 75-92, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Armando Gomes & Gordon Phillips, 2005. "Why Do Public Firms Issue Private and Public Securities?," NBER Working Papers 11294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Throwing Good Money After Bad? Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending," NBER Working Papers 8694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Campbell R. Harvey & Karl V. Lins & Andrew H. Roper, 2001. "The Effect of Capital Structure When Expected Agency Costs are Extreme," NBER Working Papers 8452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Yener Altunbaş & Alper Kara & David Marqués-Ibáñez, 2009. "Large debt financing: syndicated loans versus corporate bonds," Working Paper Series 1028, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  15. Valentín Azofra Palenzuea & Paolo Saona Hoffmann & Eleuterio Vallelado González, 2004. "Estructura De Propiedad Y Oportunidades De Crecimiento Como Determinantes Del Endeudamiento De Las Empresas Chilenas," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 7(2), pages 105-145. [Downloadable!]
  16. Zhang, Zhipeng, 2009. "Who Pulls the Plug? Theory and Evidence on Corporate Bankruptcy Decisions," MPRA Paper 17676, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Oct 2009. [Downloadable!]
  17. Zhang, Zhipeng, 2009. "Recovery Rates and Macroeconomic Conditions: The Role of Loan Covenants," MPRA Paper 17521, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  18. Bertocco Giancarlo, 2003. "The role of banks in financing small and medium firms," Economics and Quantitative Methods qf0308, Department of Economics, University of Insubria. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-17.

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