How Do Firms Choose Their Lenders? An Empirical Investigation
AbstractThis article investigates which companies finance themselves through intermediaries and which borrow directly from arm's length investors. Our empirical results show that large companies with abundant cash and collateral tap credit markets directly; these markets cater to safe and profitable industries, and are most active when riskless rates or intermediary earnings are low. We show that determinants of lender selection sharpen during investment downturns and that there are substantial asymmetries in the way firms enter and exit capital markets. These results support a theoretical framework where intermediaries have better reorganizational skills but a higher opportunity cost of capital than bondholders. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 13 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Postal: Oxford University Press, Journals Department, 2001 Evans Road, Cary, NC 27513 USA.
Web page: http://www.rfs.oupjournals.org/
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Other versions of this item:
- Miguel Cantillo & Julian Wright, 1998. "How Do Firms Choose Their Lenders? An Empirical Investigation," Finance 9803007, EconWPA.
- Miguel Cantillo and Julian Wright., 2000. "How Do Firms Choose Their Lenders? An Empirical Investigation," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-256-Rev, University of California at Berkeley.
- Cantillo, Miguel & Wright, Julian, 2000. "HOw Do Firms Choose Their Leaders? An Empirical Investigation," Research Program in Finance, Working Paper Series qt8sd393sj, Research Program in Finance, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
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