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Financial Supervision in an Integrating Europe: Measuring Cross-Border Externalities

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  • Dirk Schoenmaker
  • Sander Oosterloo

Abstract

Against the backdrop of European integration, the debate on the need for European arrangements for financial supervision and stability is intensifying in the literature as well as in the policy arena. While there is a consensus that the need for European arrangements ultimately depends on the intensity of cross-border spillover effects or externalities within the European Union (EU), there has been no attempt to measure these cross-border externalities. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. A new data set on cross-border penetration (as a proxy for cross-border externalities) of 30 large EU banking groups has been collected. Although a home country bias still exists, the data indicate that the number of groups that have the potential to pose significant cross-border externalities within the EU context is substantial and increasing. Within a four-year period (2000-03), we find a statistically significant upward trend of emerging European banking groups. Policymakers therefore face the challenge of designing European structures for financial supervision and stability to deal effectively with these emerging European banking groups. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal International Finance.

Volume (Year): 8 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (07)
Pages: 1-27

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Handle: RePEc:bla:intfin:v:8:y:2005:i:1:p:1-27

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Cited by:
  1. Claudia M. Buch & Katja Neugebauer, 2009. "Diversification of Banks' International Portfolios: Evidence and Policy Lessons," Working Paper / FINESS 2.4, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  2. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2006. "Home country versus cross-border negative externalities in large banking organization failures and how to avoid them," Working Paper 2006-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  3. Dirk Schoenmaker & Wolf Wagner, 2011. "The Impact of Cross-Border Banking on Financial Stability," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-054/2/DSF18, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Pedro Gustavo Teixeira & Garry J. Schinasi, 2006. "The Lender of Last Resort in the European Single Financial Market," IMF Working Papers 06/127, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Laurence Scialom, 2007. "Pour une politique d'actions correctives précoces dans l'Union européenne : les carences institutionnelles et légales," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 89(3), pages 111-121.
  6. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2004. "Agency problems and goal conflicts," Working Paper 2004-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  7. Kane, Edward J., 2006. "Inadequacy of nation-based and VaR-based safety nets in the European Union," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 375-387, December.
  8. D'Hulster, Katia, 2011. "Cross border banking supervision : incentive conflicts in supervisory information sharing between home and host supervisors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5871, The World Bank.
  9. David G. Mayes, 2004. "An approach to bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies," Finance 0404015, EconWPA.
  10. Berger, Helge & Hefeker, Carsten, 2006. "Does Financial Integration Make Banks Act More Prudential? Regulation, Foreign Owned Banks, and the Lender-of-Last Resort," HWWA Discussion Papers 339, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
  11. Beck, T.H.L. & Todorov, R.I. & Wagner, W.B., 2011. "Bank Supervision Going Global? A Cost-Benefit Analysis (Replaced by CentER DP 2012-059)," Discussion Paper 2011-127, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  12. Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, 2009. "Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(1), pages 141-165, March.
  13. Beck, T.H.L. & Todorov, R.I. & Wagner, W.B., 2012. "Supervising Cross-Border Banks: Theory, Evidence and Policy (Revised version of CentER Discussion Paper 2011-127)," Discussion Paper 2012-059, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  14. Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," Working Paper 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  15. Vítor Gaspar & Garry Schinasi, 2010. "Financial Stability and Policy Cooperation," Working Papers o201001, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
  16. Eisenbeis, Robert A. & Kaufman, George G., 2008. "Cross-border banking and financial stability in the EU," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 168-204, September.
  17. repec:diw:diwfin:diwfin02040 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Tröger, Tobias, 2013. "The Single Supervisory Mechanism - Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? Preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement," IMFS Working Paper Series 73, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS), Goethe University Frankfurt.

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