Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises
AbstractThis paper focuses on the recapitalization of failing banks. A recapitalization is efficient if the social benefits (preserving systemic stability) exceed the cost of recapitalization. In a national setting, the implementation of an optimal policy is relatively straightforward. But in a cross-border setting, one is confronted with possible coordination failure. Using a multicountry model, it is shown that ex post negotiations on burden sharing lead to an underprovision of recapitalizations. Next, we explore different ex ante burden sharing mechanisms to overcome the coordination failure. The first is a general scheme financed collectively by the participating countries (generic burden sharing). The second relates the burden to the location of the assets of the bank to be recapitalized (specific burden sharing). The working of the two mechanisms is calibrated with data on large cross border banks in Europe. Because the costs and benefits are better aligned in the specific scheme, it is better able to overcome the coordination failure. JEL Codes: E58, E60, G21, G28.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by International Journal of Central Banking in its journal International Journal of Central Banking.
Volume (Year): 5 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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