Deposit Insurance: Handle with Care
In: Banking Market Structure and Monetary Policy
AbstractExplicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in the past decades, most recently to countries with low levels of financial and institutional development. This paper documents the extent of crosscountry differences in deposit-insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments. The paper also includes recommendations for reforming the Chilean deposit insurance system based on the results of the research reviewed here.
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This chapter was published in: Luis Antonio Ahumada & J. Rodrigo Fuentes & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series Editor) (ed.) Banking Market Structure and Monetary Policy, , chapter 12, pages 345-358, 2004.
This item is provided by Central Bank of Chile in its series Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series with number v07c12pp345-358.
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