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The incentive-compatible design of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution : concepts and country studies

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  • Beck, Thorsten

Abstract

Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3043.

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Date of creation: 31 May 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3043

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Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform; Insurance&Risk Mitigation; Financial Intermediation; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Financial Intermediation; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring; Insurance&Risk Mitigation; Insurance Law; Banks&Banking Reform;

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  1. Demirguc-Kunt, Asl1 & Huizinga, Harry, 1999. "Market discipline and financial safety net design," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2183, The World Bank.
  2. Charles W. Calomiris, 1989. "Deposit insurance: lessons from the record," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 10-30.
  3. Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr., Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "Bank regulation and supervision : what works best?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2725, The World Bank.
  4. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, 2000. "Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?," IMF Working Papers 00/3, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Beck, Thorsten, 2001. "Deposit insurance as private club - Is Germany a model?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2559, The World Bank.
  6. De la Torre, Augusto, 2000. "Resolving bank failures in Argentina - recent developments and issues," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2295, The World Bank.
  7. Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2000. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-1999," NBER Working Papers 7715, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Edward J. Kane & Asli Demirguc-Kunt, 2001. "Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does it Work?," NBER Working Papers 8493, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Cull, Robert & Senbet, Lemma W & Sorge, Marco, 2005. "Deposit Insurance and Financial Development," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(1), pages 43-82, February.
  10. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-12, May.
  11. English, William B., 1993. "The decline of private deposit insurance in the United States," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 57-128, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Beck, T.H.L., 2008. "Resolution of failed banks by deposit insurers: Cross-country evidence," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3508404, Tilburg University.
  2. Mayes , David G., 2004. "An approach to bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies," Research Discussion Papers 4/2004, Bank of Finland.
  3. David G. Mayes, 2008. "Avoiding the Next Crisis," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(4), pages 44-50, December.
  4. Bolzico, Javier & Mascaro, Yira & Granata, Paola, 2007. "Practical guidelines for effective bank resolution," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4389, The World Bank.

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