This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Financial regulatory structure and the resolution of conflicting goals

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Larry D. Wall
Robert A. Eisenbeis

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The debate over modernizing the financial structure is raising questions about the merits of modernizing the financial regulatory structure. Regulatory structure is important because an almost unavoidable feature of our current system of government is that Congress assigns multiple goals that sometimes have conflicting policy implications to the regulatory agencies. The structure of the agencies is important to the resolution of these conflicts. Responsibility for two or more goals that have conflicting implications may be assigned to a single agency that is likely to resolve the conflict with a consistent set of policies based on the agency's priorities. Alternatively, the goals may be assigned to more than one agency, an action that often results in the conflicts being debated in the public arena but that may also result in the agencies' implementing inconsistent policies. This paper uses the problem of goal conflicts to provide a framework for evaluating alternative regulatory structures.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.frbatlanta.org/frbatlanta/filelegacydocs/wp9912.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its series Working Paper with number 99-12.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:99-12

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1000 Peachtree St., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Phone: 404-521-8500
Email:
Web page: http://www.frbatlanta.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research
Keywords: Banks and banking ; Banking structure;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alan Greenspan, 1995. "Financial innovations and the supervision of financial institutions," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 1-6.
  2. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Persons, John C., 1997. "Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring Costs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 269-306, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Larry D. Wall, 1997. "Taking note of the deposit insurance fund: a plan for the FDIC to issue capital notes," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 1, pages 14-30. [Downloadable!]
  5. Edward Kane, 1997. "Ethical Foundations of Financial Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 51-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Edward J. Kane, 1988. "Changing incentives facing financial-services regulators," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 265-279.
  7. Kane, Edward J., 1980. "Politics and Fed policymaking : The more things change the more they remain the same," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 199-211, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Edward J. Kane, 1997. "Ethical Foundations of Financial Regulation," NBER Working Papers 6020, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kane, Edward J, 1996. "De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(2), pages 141-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Edward J. Kane, 2001. "Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethicsof Financial Regulation," NBER Working Papers 8399, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Robert A. Eisenbeis & W. Scott Frame & Larry D. Wall, 2006. "An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of the policy options for reducing those risks," Working Paper 2006-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Edward Kane, 2000. "Architecture of Supra-Governmental International Financial Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 301-318, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Edward J. Kane, 1999. "How Offshore Financial Competition Disciplines Exit Resistence by Incentive-Conflicted Bank Regulators," NBER Working Papers 7156, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
  6. Edward J. Kane, 2000. "Capital Movements, Banking Insolvency, and Silent Runs in the Asian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 7514, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Joseph A. Clougherty, 2004. "Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global Context," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc and its associated services are free for contributors and users, and do not accept any advertising.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.