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Financial regulatory structure and the resolution of conflicting goals

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  • Larry D. Wall
  • Robert A. Eisenbeis

Abstract

The debate over modernizing the financial structure is raising questions about the merits of modernizing the financial regulatory structure. Regulatory structure is important because an almost unavoidable feature of our current system of government is that Congress assigns multiple goals that sometimes have conflicting policy implications to the regulatory agencies. The structure of the agencies is important to the resolution of these conflicts. Responsibility for two or more goals that have conflicting implications may be assigned to a single agency that is likely to resolve the conflict with a consistent set of policies based on the agency's priorities. Alternatively, the goals may be assigned to more than one agency, an action that often results in the conflicts being debated in the public arena but that may also result in the agencies' implementing inconsistent policies. This paper uses the problem of goal conflicts to provide a framework for evaluating alternative regulatory structures.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its series Working Paper with number 99-12.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:99-12

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Keywords: Banks and banking ; Banking structure;

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References

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  1. Edward J. Kane, 1984. "Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition Among the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies," NBER Working Papers 1331, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Kane, Edward J., 1980. "Politics and Fed policymaking : The more things change the more they remain the same," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 199-211, April.
  3. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  4. Kane, Edward J, 1996. "De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(2), pages 141-61, May.
  5. Edward J. Kane, 1997. "Ethical Foundations of Financial Regulation," NBER Working Papers 6020, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. R. Alton Gilbert, 1993. "A Comparison of Proposals to Restructure the U.S. Financial System," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_91, Levy Economics Institute.
  7. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December.
  8. Persons, John C., 1997. "Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring Costs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 269-306, October.
  9. Edward J. Kane, 1985. "The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262611856, December.
  10. Alan Greenspan, 1995. "Financial innovations and the supervision of financial institutions," Proceedings 435, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  11. Edward J. Kane, 1988. "Changing incentives facing financial-services regulators," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 265-279.
  12. Larry D. Wall, 1997. "Taking note of the deposit insurance fund: a plan for the FDIC to issue capital notes," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 1, pages 14-30.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Edward J. Kane, 2000. "Capital Movements, Banking Insolvency, and Silent Runs in the Asian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 7514, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Wall, Larry D., 2012. "Central Banking for Financial Stability: Some Lessons from the Recent Instability in the United States and Euro Area," ADBI Working Papers 379, Asian Development Bank Institute.
  3. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  4. Joseph A. Clougherty, 2004. "Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global Context," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  5. Edward Kane, 1999. "How Offshore Financial Competition Disciplines Exit Resistance by Incentive-Conflicted Bank Regulators," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 265-291, December.
  6. Kane, Edward J., 2000. "The dialectical role of information and disinformation in regulation-induced banking crises," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 8(3-4), pages 285-308, July.
  7. Edward Kane, 2000. "Architecture of Supra-Governmental International Financial Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 301-318, December.
  8. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
  9. Kane, Edward J., 2002. "Using deferred compensation to strengthen the ethics of financial regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(9), pages 1919-1933, September.
  10. Larry D. Wall, 2010. "Prudential discipline for financial firms: micro, macro, and market structures," Working Paper 2010-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  11. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2009. "Multinational Banking and Regulatory Challenges: Lessons from the US Experience with AIG," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(2), pages 13-18, 07.
  12. Robert Eisenbeis & W. Frame & Larry Wall, 2007. "An Analysis of the Systemic Risks Posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and An Evaluation of the Policy Options for Reducing Those Risks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 75-99, June.
  13. Larry D. Wall, 2012. "Central banking for financial stability Some lessons from the recent instability in the US and euro area," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 8(3), pages 247-280, August.

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