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An empirical application of the median voter model and of the interest group influence model to the Portuguese and Galician municipalities

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José Cruz ()

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Abstract

The analysis of the median voter hypothesis indicates that a more realistic comprehension of local public choice might be achieved with the opening of the median voter model to the interst group influence hypothesis. A non-nested specification that combines the two models is estimated and its results are compared to the median voter model (MVM) and to the interest group influence model (IGM) results. The empirical analysis is developed for the Portuguese and the Galician municipalities. In addition, I tested the hypothesis of the relative political power of the median voter and of interest groups to vary with the dimension of the population of the municipalities. Finally, I analyse the existence of institutional and political differences between the two territories and their effects on the results. Fiscal illusion is compared for Portugal and Galicia.

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File URL: http://www-sre.wu-wien.ac.at/ersa/ersaconfs/ersa01/papers/full/25.pdf
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Paper provided by European Regional Science Association in its series ERSA conference papers with number ersa01p25.

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Date of creation: Aug 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa01p25

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  1. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Baron, David P, 1989. "Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 45-72, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Frey, Bruno S & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 174-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dougan, William R & Kenyon, Daphne A, 1988. "Pressure Groups and Public Expenditures: The Flypaper Effect Reconsidered," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 159-70, January.
  6. Hoyt, William H. & Toma, Eugenia Froedge, 1989. "State mandates and interest group lobbying," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 199-213, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
  8. Congleton, Roger D & Bennett, Randall W, 1995. " On the Political Economy of State Highway Expenditures: Some Evidence of the Relative Performance of Alternative Public Choice Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 84(1-2), pages 1-24, July.
  9. Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard & Munley, Vincent G., 1992. "Economic incentives and political institutions: Spending and voting in school budget referenda," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 1-33, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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