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Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume

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  • Attar, Andrea
  • Campioni, Eloisa

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.

Volume (Year): 57 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 315-343

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Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:57:y:2003:i:4:p:315-343

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941

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References

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  1. Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Online Appendix to Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Technical Appendices lacker01, Review of Economic Dynamics.
  2. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-48, April.
  3. C. Choe, 1998. "A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 237-255.
  4. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  6. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  7. Stephen D. Williamson, 1984. "Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 583, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  8. Charles W. Calormiris & Berry Wilson, 1998. "Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: The 1930's Capital Crunch and Scramble to Shed Risk," NBER Working Papers 6649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. John H. Boyd & Bruce D. Smith, 1995. "The evolution of debt and equity markets in economic development," Working Papers 542, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  10. Mathias Dewatripont, 1989. "Renegotiation and information revelation over time: the case of optimal labor contacts," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9573, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  11. Pietro Reichlin & Paolo Siconolfi, 2004. "Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 75-109, 07.
  12. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1998. "Collateralized debt as the optimal contract," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  13. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
  14. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
  15. Townsend, Robert M., 1988. "Information constrained insurance : The revelation principle extended," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 411-450.
  16. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
  17. Suarez, Javier & Sussman, Oren, 1997. "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1604, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Boyd, John H. & Smith, Bruce D., 1999. "The Use of Debt and Equity in Optimal Financial Contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 270-316, October.
  19. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
  20. Chang, Chun, 1990. "The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 68-86, October.
  21. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  22. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May.
  23. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
  24. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
  25. Tridib Sharma, 2003. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 387-390, January.
  26. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
  27. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2003. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Reply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 391-393, January.
  28. Webb, David C, 1992. "Two-Period Financial Contracts with Private Information and Costly State Verification," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 1113-23, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Philipp Meyer-Brauns, 2014. "Financial Contracting with Tax Evaders," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance tax-mpg-rps-2014-01, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  2. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.
  3. ATTAR, Andréa, 2003. "Financial contracting along the business cycle," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2003069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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