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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 95/24.

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Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:95/24

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1. Hellwig, Martin, 1998. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Compatibility with Ex Post Information Asymmetry," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-38, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
2. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni, 2002. "Costly State Verification And Debt Contracts," Departmental Working Papers 172, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]

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