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L'audit en assurance

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  • Bénédicte Coestier
  • Nathalie Fombaron
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2003-41.

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    Date of creation: 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2003-41

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Contracting under Ex Post Moral Hazard and Non-Commitment," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-30, CIRANO.
    2. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1984. "Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 447-470, Winter.
    3. Crocker, Keith J & Tennyson, Sharon, 2002. "Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 469-507, October.
    4. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
    5. G. Dionne & R. Gagné, 1997. "The non-optimality of deductible contracts against fraudulent claims : an empirical evidence in automobile insurance," THEMA Working Papers 97-23, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    6. P. Picard, 1996. "On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost," THEMA Working Papers 96-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    7. Bond, E.W. & Crocker, K.J., 1993. "Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs," Papers 10-93-1b, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    8. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    9. repec:ltr:wpaper:1995.18 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P. & Gibbens, A., 1993. "An Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche 93010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    11. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    12. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Pierre Picard, 1998. "Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing," Working Papers 98-47, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
    13. G. Dionne & F. Giuliano & P. Picard, 2002. "Optimal auditing for insurance fraud," THEMA Working Papers 2002-32, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    14. GOLLIER, Christian, . "Pareto-optimal risk sharing with fixed costs per claim," CORE Discussion Papers RP -774, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
    16. Winton, Andrew, 1995. "Costly State Verification and Multiple Investors: The Role of Seniority," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(1), pages 91-123.
    17. Schiller, Jörg, 2002. "The impact of insurance fraud detection systems," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 8, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    18. Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1993. "Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game," Carleton Economic Papers 93-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
    19. Chang, Chun, 1990. "The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 68-86, October.
    20. Greenberg, Joseph, 1984. "Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-13, February.
    21. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee, 1989. "Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 139-163, Summer.
    22. Boyd, J.h. & Smith, B.D., 1991. "The Equilibrium Allocation of Investment Capital in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Costly State Verification," RCER Working Papers 289, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    23. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1999. "The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 1039-1048, April.
    24. Keith J. Crocker & John Morgan, 1998. "Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 355-375, April.
    25. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
    26. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
    27. Stephen D. Williamson, 1984. "Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Working Papers 572, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    28. M. Martin Boyer, 2000. "Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(2), pages 159-178, December.
    29. Boyd, John H & Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 539-61, October.
    30. Chongwoo Choe, 1995. "Contract Design and Costly Verification Games," Working Papers 1995.18, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    31. Lacker, J.M., 1989. "Optimal Contracts Under Costly State Falsification," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 956, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    32. Boccard, Nicolas & Legros, Patrick, 2002. "Audit Competition in Insurance Oligopolies," CEPR Discussion Papers 3478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    33. Stephen D. Williamson, 1984. "Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Working Papers 583, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    34. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May.
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