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Versicherungsbetrug als ökonomisches Problem: Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse

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  • Schiller, Jörg
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    Abstract

    Betrügerische Schadenmeldungen sind ein wohlbekanntes Phänomen und führen auf einzelnen Versicherungsmärkten zu schwerwiegenden Problemen. Im Rahmen des vorliegenden Beitrags wird zum einen erläutert, warum Versicherungsbetrug als ein vertragstheoretisches Problem angesehen werden kann. Zum anderen werden - vor dem Hintergrund bestehender Ergebnisse der ökonomischen Vertragstheorie - ausgewählte Ansatzpunkte zur Betrugsbekämpfung und insbesondere das Problem der Sanktionierung von ertappten Betrügern analysiert. -- Fraudulent claims are a well-known phenomenon and a serious problem in some insurance markets. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First of all, it explains why insurance fraud can be considered as a contractual problem. Consequently, selected instruments to fight insurance fraud and problems concerning the punishment of detected defrauders are analyzed by using existing results of contract theory.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance in its series Working Papers on Risk and Insurance with number 13.

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    Date of creation: 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:hzvwps:13

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    Keywords: Versicherungsbetrug; Vertragstheorie; Sanktionierung; insurance fraud; contract theory; punishment;

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    1. Jörg Schiller, 2006. "The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(3), pages 421-438.
    2. Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 8831, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    3. Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P. & Gibbens, A., 1993. "An Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 93010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    4. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    5. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
    6. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
    7. Doherty, Neil A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1983. "Optimal Insurance in Incomplete Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 1045-54, December.
    8. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Contracting under Ex Post Moral Hazard and Non-Commitment," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2001s-30, CIRANO.
    9. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2003. "Optimal Auditing for Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE 0329, CIRPEE.
    10. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
    11. Lacker, J.M., 1989. "Optimal Contracts Under Costly State Falsification," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 956, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    12. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
    13. Crocker, Keith J & Tennyson, Sharon, 2002. "Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 469-507, October.
    14. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers, Departmental Working Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
    15. M. Martin Boyer & Jörg Schiller, 2003. "Merging Automobile Insurance Regulatory Bodies: The Case of Atlantic Canada," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2003s-70, CIRANO.
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