Workers' Compensation And Moral Hazard

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Workers' Compensation And Moral Hazard

Author Info

DIONNE, G.
ST-MICHEL, P.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Georges Dionne

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 8831.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:8831

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Related research
Keywords: moral hazard ; workers;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Dionne, Georges & St-Michel, Pierre, 1991. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 236-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 8831, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

M. Martin Boyer & Jörg Schiller, 2003. "Merging Automobile Insurance Regulatory Bodies: The Case of Atlantic Canada," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-70, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Michele Campolieti, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Disability Insurance: On the Incidence of Hard-to-Diagnose Medical Conditions in the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan Disability Program," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 28(3), pages 419-441, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
G. Dionne & R. Gagné, 2000. "Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance," THEMA Working Papers 2000-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dionne, G. & Gagne, R., 2000. "Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunitic Fraud in Automobile Insurance," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 00-01, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
- Dionne, Georges & Gagne, Robert, 2002. " Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 213-30, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2007. "Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data," Working Papers hal-00243056_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
P. Picard, 1998. "Insurance fraud : theory," THEMA Working Papers 98-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
Dionne, G. & Michaud, P.C. & Dahchour, M., 2004. "Separating moral hazard from adverse selection in automobile insurance : longitudinal evidence from France," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Georges Dionne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Maki Dahchour, 2004. "Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France," Cahiers de recherche 0420, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
Denis Bolduc & Bernard Fortin & France Labrecque & Paul Lanoie, 1997. "Incentive Effects of Public Insurance Programs on the Occurence and the Composition of Workplace Injuries," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-24, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie, 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation: A Survey," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-04, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fortin, B. & Lanoie, P., 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation : A Survey," Papers 9816, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
- Fortin, Bernard & Lanoie, Paul, 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation: A Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9816, Université Laval - Département d'économique. [Downloadable!]
Robert E. Hoyt & David B. Mustard & Lars S. Powell, 2005. "The Effectiveness of Insurance Fraud Statutues: Evidence from Automobile Insurance," Risk and Insurance 0501001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie & Christine Laporte, 1995. "Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance?," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-48, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fortin, Bernard & Lanoie, Paul & Laporte, Christine, 1996. "Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance?," Cahiers de recherche 9601, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Fortin, B. & Lanoie, P. & Laporte, C., 1996. "Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance?," Papers 9601, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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