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Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunitic Fraud in Automobile Insurance

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Author Info

  • Dionne, G.
  • Gagne, R.

Abstract

In this paper we have proposed a methodology to separate moral hazard from adverse selection.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques. in its series Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- with number 00-01.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:etcori:00-01

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Postal: Canada; ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES COMMERCIALES(H.E.C.),3000, chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine. Montreal (Quebec) Canada H3T 2A7.
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Web page: http://www.hec.ca/
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Keywords: ASSURANCE AUTOMOBILE ; RISQUE MORAL;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 8831, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  2. Keith J. Crocker & John Morgan, 1998. "Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 355-375, April.
  3. Butler, Richard J & Durbin, David L & Helvacian, Nurhan M, 1996. "Increasing Claims for Soft Tissue Injuries in Workers' Compensation: Cost Shifting and Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 73-87, July.
  4. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre M., 1999. "Optimal Industrial Policy," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1999004, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  5. Picard, Pierre, 2000. "On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1049-71, November.
  6. Dionne, G. & Gourieroux, C. & Vanasse, C., 1998. "The Informational Content of Household Decisions with Applications to Insurance under Adverse Selection," Papers 9806, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  7. Dionne, G., 1998. "La mesure empirique des problemes d'information," Papers 9833, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  8. Cummins, J David & Tennyson, Sharon, 1996. "Moral Hazard in Insurance Claiming: Evidence from Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 29-50, January.
  9. Caron, L. & Dionne, G., 1996. "Insurance Fraud Estimation: More Evidence from the Quebec Automobile Insurance Industry," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 96-02, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
  10. Fortin, Bernard & Lanoie, Paul, 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation: A Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9816, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  11. P. Picard, 1998. "Insurance fraud : theory," THEMA Working Papers 98-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  12. Devlin, R.A., 1988. "Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis Of The Experience In Quebec," Working Papers 88126, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics.
  13. Marcel Boyer & Georges Dionne, 1987. "Description and Analysis of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Plan," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 13(2), pages 181-195, June.
  14. Bond, E.W. & Crocker, K.J., 1993. "Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs," Papers 10-93-1b, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  15. Fortin, Bernard & Lanoie, Paul, 1992. "Substitution between unemployment insurance and workers' compensation : An analysis applied to the risk of workplace accidents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 287-312, December.
  16. Boyer, M Martin, 2000. " Insurance Taxation and Insurance Fraud," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(1), pages 101-34.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Georges Dionne & Kili Wang, 2013. "Does insurance fraud in automobile theft insurance fluctuate with the business cycle?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 67-92, August.
  2. Georges Dionne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Maki Dahchour, 2004. "Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France," Cahiers de recherche 0420, CIRPEE.
  3. Yarmukhamedov, Sherzod, 2013. "Empirical analysis of moral hazard: a study of a vehicle insurance tax reform," Working papers in Transport Economics 2013:14, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
  4. Dionne, Georges & Giuliano, Florence & Picard, Pierre, 2009. "Optimal auditing with scoring: theory and application to insurance fraud," MPRA Paper 18374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
  6. M. Dahchour & G. Dionne, 2002. "Pricing of Automobile Insurance Under Asymmetric Information : a Study on Panel Data," THEMA Working Papers 2002-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  7. Yufei Jin & Roderick Rejesus & Bertis Little, 2005. "Binary choice models for rare events data: a crop insurance fraud application," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(7), pages 841-848.
  8. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2003. "Optimal Auditing for Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche 0329, CIRPEE.
  9. Boyer, Martin, 2001. "Les clauses de valeur à neuf sont-elles optimales?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(1), pages 53-74, mars.
  10. Raduna, Daniela Viviana & Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2011. "Risk aversion influence on insurance market," MPRA Paper 37725, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Feb 2012.
  11. Georges Dionne & Kili C. Wang, 2011. "Does Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile theft Insurance Fluctuate with the Business Cycle ?," Cahiers de recherche 1121, CIRPEE.
  12. Gollier, Christian, 2007. "The Determinants of the Insurance Demand by Firms," IDEI Working Papers 468, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  13. Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche 1233, CIRPEE.

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