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Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunitic Fraud in Automobile Insurance

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Author Info
Dionne, G.
Gagne, R.

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Abstract

In this paper we have proposed a methodology to separate moral hazard from adverse selection.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques. in its series Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- with number 00-01.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:etcori:00-01

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canada; ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES COMMERCIALES(H.E.C.),3000, chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine. Montreal (Quebec) Canada H3T 2A7.
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Web page: http://www.hec.ca/
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Related research
Keywords: ASSURANCE AUTOMOBILE ; RISQUE MORAL;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Dionne, G., 1998. "La mesure empirique des problemes d'information," Papers 9833, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    Other versions:
  2. Bond, Eric W. & Crocker, Keith J., 1997. "Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 239-264, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Dionne, G. & Gourieroux, C. & Vanasse, C., 1998. "The Informational Content of Household Decisions with Applications to Insurance under Adverse Selection," Papers 9806, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    Other versions:
  4. Fortin, B. & Lanoie, P., 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation : A Survey," Papers 9816, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
    Other versions:
  5. Boyer, M Martin, 2000. " Insurance Taxation and Insurance Fraud," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(1), pages 101-34. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Butler, Richard J & Durbin, David L & Helvacian, Nurhan M, 1996. "Increasing Claims for Soft Tissue Injuries in Workers' Compensation: Cost Shifting and Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 73-87, July.
  7. Devlin, R.A., 1988. "Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis Of The Experience In Quebec," Working Papers 88126, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics.
  8. Dionne, Georges & St-Michel, Pierre, 1991. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 236-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. L. Caron & G. Dionne, 1997. "Insurance fraud estimation : more evidence from the Quebec automobile insurance industry," THEMA Working Papers 97-21, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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  10. Cummins, J David & Tennyson, Sharon, 1996. "Moral Hazard in Insurance Claiming: Evidence from Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 29-50, January.
  11. Keith J. Crocker & John Morgan, 1998. "Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 355-375, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. P. Picard, 1996. "On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost," THEMA Working Papers 96-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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  13. Marcel Boyer & Georges Dionne, 1987. "Description and Analysis of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Plan," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 13(2), pages 181-195, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. P. Picard, 1998. "Insurance fraud : theory," THEMA Working Papers 98-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dionne, G. & Michaud, P.C. & Dahchour, M., 2004. "Separating moral hazard from adverse selection in automobile insurance : longitudinal evidence from France," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. M. Dahchour & G. Dionne, 2002. "Pricing of Automobile Insurance Under Asymmetric Information : a Study on Panel Data," THEMA Working Papers 2002-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gollier, Christian, 2007. "The Determinants of the Insurance Demand by Firms," IDEI Working Papers 468, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  4. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2005. "Optimal Auditing with Scoring Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00243026_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  5. Yufei Jin & Roderick M. Rejesus & Bertis B. Little, 2005. "Binary choice models for rare events data: a crop insurance fraud application," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(7), pages 841-848, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2003. "Optimal Auditing for Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche 0329, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

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