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Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard

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Author Info
Dionne, Georges
St-Michel, Pierre

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Abstract

Two types of moral hazard have been determined. The first type is related to self-prevention activities affecting probabilities of accidents. The second type relates to the agent's activities whenever the accident occurs. The authors' objective consists of presenting an empirical measure of the significance of this second type of moral hazard in the workers' compensation market. The main challenge in isolating moral hazard consists of dividing into two parts the total variation in recovery time with respect to changes in insurance coverage: (1) the variation of consumption corresponding to a given level of information; and (2) the variation of consumption due to greater asymmetrical information. The methodology used in this study separates these two variations. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics & Statistics.

Volume (Year): 73 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 236-44
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:73:y:1991:i:2:p:236-44

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  1. M. Martin Boyer & Jörg Schiller, 2003. "Merging Automobile Insurance Regulatory Bodies: The Case of Atlantic Canada," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-70, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  2. Michele Campolieti, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Disability Insurance: On the Incidence of Hard-to-Diagnose Medical Conditions in the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan Disability Program," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 28(3), pages 419-441, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. G. Dionne & R. Gagné, 2000. "Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance," THEMA Working Papers 2000-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2007. "Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data," Working Papers hal-00243056_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  5. P. Picard, 1998. "Insurance fraud : theory," THEMA Working Papers 98-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dionne, G. & Michaud, P.C. & Dahchour, M., 2004. "Separating moral hazard from adverse selection in automobile insurance : longitudinal evidence from France," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Denis Bolduc & Bernard Fortin & France Labrecque & Paul Lanoie, 1997. "Incentive Effects of Public Insurance Programs on the Occurence and the Composition of Workplace Injuries," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-24, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie, 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation: A Survey," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-04, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Robert E. Hoyt & David B. Mustard & Lars S. Powell, 2005. "The Effectiveness of Insurance Fraud Statutues: Evidence from Automobile Insurance," Risk and Insurance 0501001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie & Christine Laporte, 1995. "Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance?," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-48, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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