Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud
AbstractWe survey recent developments in the economic analysis of insurance fraud. The paper first sets out the two main approaches to insurance fraud that have been developped in the literature, namely the costly state verification and the costly state falsification. Under costly state verification, the insurer can verify claims at some cost. Claims' verification may be deterministic or random, and it can be conditioned on fraud signals perceived by insurers. Under costly state falsification, the policyholder expends resources for the building-up of his or her claim not to be detected. We also consider the effects of adverse selection, in a context where insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from potential defrauders, as well as the consequences of credibility constraints on anti-fraud policies. Finally, we focus attention on the risk of collusion between policyholders and insurance agents or service providers.
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Date of creation: 27 Aug 2012
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Fraud; audit; verification; falsification; collusion; build-up.;
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