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Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs

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Author Info
Bond, E.W.
Crocker, K.J.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 10-93-1b.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:10-93-1b

Contact details of provider:
Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.
Phone: (814)865-1456
Fax: (814)863-4775
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: insurance ; information ; contracts;

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Cited by:
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  1. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Contracting under Ex Post Moral Hazard and Non-Commitment," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-30, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Neil Doherty & Kent Smetters, 2002. "Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets," NBER Working Papers 9050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bénédicte Coestier & Nathalie Fombaron, 2003. "L'audit en assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2003-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  4. M. Martin Boyer & Jörg Schiller, 2003. "Merging Automobile Insurance Regulatory Bodies: The Case of Atlantic Canada," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-70, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  5. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  6. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-41, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ludovic RENOU, 2003. "Beliefs about Beliefs and Endogenous Formation of a Multi-lender Coalition in a Costly State Verification Model," Economics Working Papers ECO2003/21, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  8. Domenico Scalera & Alberto Zazzaro, 2007. "The Unpleasant Effects of Price Deregulation in the European Third-Party Motor Insurance Market: A Theoretical Framework," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1). [Downloadable!]
  9. Richard Watt, 2003. "Curtailing Ex-Post Fraud in Risk Sharing Arrangements," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 247-263, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Robert F. Graboyes, 2000. "Our money or your life : indemnities vs. deductibles in health insurance," Working Paper 00-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  11. M. Martin Boyer & Pierre Thomas Léger, 2001. "Inflation as a Strategic Response," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-26, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  12. G. Dionne & R. Gagné, 2000. "Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance," THEMA Working Papers 2000-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann, 2005. "Insuring the Uninsurable: Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/24, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
  14. Alma Cohen, 2006. "The Disadvantages of Aggregate Deductibles," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  15. Rejesus, Roderick M., 2002. "Ex Post Moral Hazard In Crop Insurance: Costly State Verification Or Falsification?," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19650, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  16. P. Picard, 1998. "Insurance fraud : theory," THEMA Working Papers 98-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

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