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The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation

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Bester, Helmut

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Abstract

This paper studies the effect of debt renegotiation on the design of optimal loan arrangements in a model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information. Renegotiation may occur because bankruptcy involves costly asset liquidation, which is ex post inefficient. The author shows that the extent of the entrepreneur's liabilities in the optimal loan contract depends upon the creditor's commitment to impose bankruptcy should default ever occur. A limited liability arrangement is optimal whenever the creditor is precommited not to forgive any portion of the outstanding debt. Otherwise debt may efficiently be secured by outside collateral. Copyright 1994 by Ohio State University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 26 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 72-86
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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:26:y:1994:i:1:p:72-86

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  1. Reint Gropp & John Karl Scholz & Michelle White, 1996. "Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand," NBER Working Papers 5653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Karim El Aynaoui, 2008. "Excess Liquidity, Bank Pricing Rules, and Monetary Policy," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 105, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  3. Richard Scheelings, 2005. "Essays in Law and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000950, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Raffaella Barone & Roy Cerqueti & Anna Grazia Quaranta, 2007. "A stochastic model for financiers," Working Papers 42-2007, Macerata University, Department of Finance and Economic Sciences, revised Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
  5. Michelle J. White, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law," NBER Working Papers 11536, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Karel Janda, 2004. "Bankruptcy Procedures with Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Papers IES 61, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
  7. Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2000. "Collateral, Default Risk, and Relationship Lending: An Empirical Study on Financial Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 2540, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Leonardo Becchetti & Melody Garcia, 2008. "Do collateral theories work in social banking ?," CEIS Research Paper 131, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 07 Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
  9. Dorothea Schäfer & Axel Werwatz & Volker Zimmermann, 2003. "The Determinants of Debt and (Private-) Equity Financing in Young Innovative SMEs: Evidence from Germany," CFS Working Paper Series 2004/06, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Catherine Refait, 2005. "Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise? Comprendre la décision de la banque," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Editions Economica, vol. 8(1), pages 131-157, March.
  11. Jana Bruder & Doris Neuberger & Solvig Raethke-Doeppner, 2007. "Financial Constraints of Ethnic Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Germany," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 84, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  13. Karel Janda, 2008. "Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures?," Working Papers IES 2008/12, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
  14. Nan-Kuang Chen & Hsiao-Lei Chu, 2003. "Collateral Value and Forbearance Lending," CEP Discussion Papers dp0603, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  15. Lukas Menkhoff & Doris Neuberger & Chodechai Suwanaporn, 2005. "Collateral-Based Lending in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Thailand," Finance 0501008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Jeremy Berkowitz & Michelle J. White, 2002. "Bankruptcy and Small Firms' Access to Credit," NBER Working Papers 9010, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Pozzolo, Alberto Franco, 2004. "The Role of Guarantees in Bank Lending," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp04021, University of Molise, Dept. SEGeS. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Brunner, Antje & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2004. "Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring," CEPR Discussion Papers 4287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Langer, Thomas & Waller, Peter, 1997. "Implementing Behavioral Concepts into Banking Theory: The Impact of Loss Aversion on Collateralization," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-33, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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