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Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey

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  • Markus K. Brunnermeier
  • Thomas M. Eisenbach
  • Yuliy Sannikov

Abstract

This article surveys the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions. Financial frictions lead to persistence and when combined with illiquidity to non-linear amplification effects. Risk is endogenous and liquidity spirals cause financial instability. Increasing margins further restrict leverage and exacerbate downturns. A demand for liquid assets and a role for money emerges. The market outcome is generically not even constrained efficient and the issuance of government debt can lead to a Pareto improvement. While financial institutions can mitigate frictions, they introduce additional fragility and through their erratic money creation harm price stability.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000384.

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Date of creation: 29 Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000384

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  1. Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey
    by Christian Zimmermann in NEP-DGE blog on 2012-03-15 20:19:38
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