Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts
AbstractThe paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy. When everyone engages in maturity transformation, authorities have little choice but facilitating refinancing. In turn, refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity. The key ingredient is that monetary policy is non-targeted. The ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage, while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed. This insight has important consequences. First, banks choose to correlate their risk exposures. Second, private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest-rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity. Third, optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent. Fourth, macro-prudential supervision is called for. We characterize the optimal regulation, which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets. We establish the robustness of our insights when the set of bailout instruments is endogenous and characterize the structure of optimal bailouts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2009.57.
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Monetary Policy; Funding Liquidity Risk; Strategic Complementarities; Macro-Prudential Supervision;
Other versions of this item:
- Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 60-93, February.
- Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2009. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts," TSE Working Papers 09-052, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2010.
- Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2009. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts," NBER Working Papers 15138, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2009. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts," IDEI Working Papers 571, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Oct 2010.
- Jean Tirole & Emmanuel Farhi, 2010. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," 2010 Meeting Papers 822, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-07-28 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MAC-2009-07-28 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2009-07-28 (Regulation)
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