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Too many to fail--An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies

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Acharya, Viral V.
Yorulmazer, Tanju

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Intermediation.

Volume (Year): 16 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-31
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:16:y:2007:i:1:p:1-31

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622875

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barron, John M & Valev, Neven T, 2000. "International Lending by U.S. Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 357-81, August.
  2. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-12, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hoggarth, Glenn & Jackson, Patricia & Nier, Erlend, 2005. "Banking crises and the design of safety nets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 143-159, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. "Herd Behavior and Investment: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 705-706, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Acharya, Viral V & Bharath, Sreedhar T & Srinivasan, Anand, 2003. "Understanding the Recovery Rates on Defaulted Securities," CEPR Discussion Papers 4098, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Enrica Detragiache & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 2000. "Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?," IMF Working Papers 00/3, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Patrick Honohan & Daniela Klingebiel, 2000. "Controlling fiscal costs of banking crises," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 284-319.
  9. Viral Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, . "Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures," Bank of England working papers 328, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1999. "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," NBER Working Papers 7430, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Acharya, Viral V., 2009. "A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Viral Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, . "Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures," Bank of England working papers 328, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Acharya, Viral V & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2005. "Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Bank Bailout Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 5154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Wagner, Wolf, 2006. "Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises," Discussion Paper 71, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Wagner, Wolf, 2006. "The broadening of activities in the financial system : implications for financial stability and regulation," Discussion Paper 72, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Acharya, Viral V & Shin, Hyun Song & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2007. "Fire Sales, Foreign Entry and Bank Liquidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 6309, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2007. "Commitment and equilibrium bank runs," Staff Reports 274, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  8. Nancy Silva, 2008. "Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and the Risk of Runs," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 474, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
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