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Last Bank Standing: What Do I Gain if You Fail?

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Author Info
Perotti, Enrico C
Suarez, Javier

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Abstract

Banks are highly leveraged institutions, potentially attracted to speculative lending even without deposit insurance. A counterbalancing incentive to lend prudently is the risk of loss of charter value, which depends on future rents. We show in a dynamic model that current concentration does not reduce speculative lending, and may in fact increase it. In contrast, a policy of temporary increases in market concentration after a bank failure, by promoting a takeover of failed banks by a solvent institution, is very effective. By making speculative lending decisions strategic substitutes, it grants bankers an incentive to remain solvent. Subsequent entry policy fine-tunes the trade-off between the social costs of reduced competition and the gain in stability.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2933.

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Date of creation: Aug 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2933

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Related research
Keywords: bank mergers; banking crises; charter value; market structure dynamics; prudential regulation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

Cited by:
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  1. Kaniska Dam & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "Does Market Concentration Preclude Risk Taking in Banking?," ESE Discussion Papers 120, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    Other versions:
  2. Repullo, Rafael, 2003. "Capital Requirements, Market Power and Risk-Taking in Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 3721, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Elena Carletti & Philipp Hartmann & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2003. "Bank mergers, competition and liquidity," Working Paper Series 292, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Kaniska Dam & Susana Wendy Zendejas Castillo, 2006. "Market power and risk taking behavior of banks," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 21(1), pages 55-84. [Downloadable!]
  5. Acharya, Viral V & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2005. "Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Bank Bailout Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 5154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Wagner, Wolf, 2006. "Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises," Discussion Paper 71, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2004. "Banks without Parachutes - Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies," Discussion Papers 8, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Beck, Thorsten, 2008. "Bank competition and financial stability : friends or foes ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4656, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Stijn Claessens, 2009. "Competition in the Financial Sector: Overview of Competition Policies," IMF Working Papers 09/45, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Martin Cihák & Klaus Schaeck & Simon Wolfe, 2006. "Are More Competitive Banking Systems More Stable?," IMF Working Papers 06/143, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jaap W.B. Bos & P.C. van Santen & P. Schilp, 2009. "Reallocating Profits in Restructuring Industries: Evidence from European and US Banking," Working Papers 09-12, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Andrea M. Maechler & Sandra Marcelino & Paulo Flavio Nacif Drummond, 2007. "Italy-Assessing Competition and Efficiency in the Banking System," IMF Working Papers 07/26, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  13. Martinez-Miera, David & Repullo, Rafael, 2008. "Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6669, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Wilko Bolt & Alexander F. Tieman, 2004. "Banking Competition, Risk, and Regulation," IMF Working Papers 04/11, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Ramon Caminal, 2002. "Taxation of banks: A theoretical framework," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 525.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  16. Carol Ann Northcott, 2004. "Competition in Banking: A Review of the Literature," Working Papers 04-24, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  17. Kaniska Dam & Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2009. "On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking," ESE Discussion Papers 187, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  18. Olga Andreeva, 2004. "Aggregate bankruptcy probabilities and their role in explaining banks’ loan losses," Working Paper 2004/02, Norges Bank. [Downloadable!]
  19. Kaniska Dam & Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2009. "On the Relationship between Market Concentration and Bank Risk Taking," DEA Working Papers 36, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada. [Downloadable!]
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