Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures

Contents:

Author Info

  • Viral Acharya
  • Tanju Yorulmazer

Abstract

As the number of bank failures increases, the set of assets available for acquisition by the surviving banks enlarges but the total amount of available liquidity within the surviving banks falls. This results in ‘cash-in-the-market’ pricing for liquidation of banking assets. At a sufficiently large number of bank failures, and in turn, at a sufficiently low level of asset prices, there are too many banks to liquidate and inefficient users of assets who are liquidity-endowed may end up owning the liquidated assets. In order to avoid this allocation inefficiency, it may be ex-post optimal for the regulator to bail out some failed banks. We show however that there exists a policy that involves liquidity assistance to surviving banks in the purchase of failed banks and that is equivalent to the bailout policy from an ex-post standpoint. Crucially, the liquidity provision policy gives banks incentives to differentiate, rather than to herd, makes aggregate banking crises less likely, and, thereby dominates the bailout policy from an ex-ante standpoint.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2007/WP328.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bank of England in its series Bank of England working papers with number 328.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:328

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Publications Group Bank of England Threadneedle Street London EC2R 8AH
Phone: +44 (0)171 601 4030
Fax: +44 (0)171 601 5196
Email:
Web page: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Acharya, Viral V., 2009. "A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 224-255, September.
  2. Hoggarth, Glenn & Reis, Ricardo & Saporta, Victoria, 2002. "Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 825-855, May.
  3. Allen, F. & Gale, D., 1991. "Limited Market Participation and Volatility of Asset Prices," Weiss Center Working Papers, Wharton School - Weiss Center for International Financial Research 2-92, Wharton School - Weiss Center for International Financial Research.
  4. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998. "Optimal Financial Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1245-1284, 08.
  5. Glenn Hoggarth & Jack Reidhill & Peter Sinclair, 2004. "On the resolution of banking crises: theory and evidence," Bank of England working papers 229, Bank of England.
  6. Acharya, Viral V & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2004. "Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 4778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998. "Financial Contagion Journal of Political Economy," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania 98-31, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  8. Berger, Philip G. & Ofek, Eli & Swary, Itzhak, 1996. "Investor valuation of the abandonment option," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 257-287, October.
  9. Acharya, Viral V. & Bharath, Sreedhar T. & Srinivasan, Anand, 2007. "Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 787-821, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:328. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Publications Team).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.