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Too many to fail - an analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies

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Viral Acharya
Tanju Yorulmazer

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Abstract

While the ‘too-big-to-fail’ guarantee is explicitly a part of bank regulation in many countries, this paper shows that bank closure policies also suffer from an implicit ‘too-many-to-fail’ problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the surviving banks. This gives banks incentives to herd and increases the risk that many banks may fail together. The ex-post optimal regulation may thus be time-inconsistent or suboptimal from an ex-ante standpoint. In contrast to the too-big-to-fail problem which mainly affects large banks, we show that the too-many-to-fail problem affects small banks more by giving them stronger incentives to herd.

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Paper provided by Bank of England in its series Bank of England working papers with number 319.

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Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:319

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barron, John M & Valev, Neven T, 2000. "International Lending by U.S. Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 357-81, August.
  2. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-12, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hoggarth, Glenn & Jackson, Patricia & Nier, Erlend, 2005. "Banking crises and the design of safety nets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 143-159, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. "Herd Behavior and Investment: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 705-706, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Acharya, Viral V & Bharath, Sreedhar T & Srinivasan, Anand, 2003. "Understanding the Recovery Rates on Defaulted Securities," CEPR Discussion Papers 4098, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Enrica Detragiache & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 2000. "Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?," IMF Working Papers 00/3, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Patrick Honohan & Daniela Klingebiel, 2000. "Controlling fiscal costs of banking crises," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 284-319.
  9. Viral Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, . "Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures," Bank of England working papers 328, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1999. "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," NBER Working Papers 7430, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Acharya, Viral V., 2009. "A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Nancy Silva, 2008. "Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and the Risk of Runs," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 474, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
  3. Wagner, Wolf, 2006. "The broadening of activities in the financial system : implications for financial stability and regulation," Discussion Paper 72, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Acharya, Viral V & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2005. "Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Bank Bailout Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 5154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Wagner, Wolf, 2006. "Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises," Discussion Paper 71, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Viral Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, . "Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures," Bank of England working papers 328, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2007. "Commitment and equilibrium bank runs," Staff Reports 274, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  8. Acharya, Viral V & Shin, Hyun Song & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2007. "Fire Sales, Foreign Entry and Bank Liquidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 6309, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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