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A Model of the Lender of Last Resort

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Author Info
Haizhou Huang
Charles Goodhart ()

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Abstract

This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort (LOLR). In a simple one-period setting, the Central Bank (CB) should only rescue banks which are above a threshold size, thus providing an analytical basis for ¶too big to fail¶. In a dynamic setting, the CBs optimal LOLR policy is time varying and contingent on the probabilities and effects of failure and of the likelihood of a bank requiring LOLR being insolvent. If contagion is the main concern, then the CB in general would have an excessive incentive to rescue especially large banks. If moral hazard is the main concern, the CB in general would have little incentive to rescue banks. When both contagion and moral hazard are jointly analyzed, then the CBs incentive to rescue are stronger than in the single period setting, but weaker than in the dynamic setting with contagion alone.

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Paper provided by Financial Markets Group in its series FMG Discussion Papers with number dp313.

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Date of creation: Jan 1999
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Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp313

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  1. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Carsten Detken & Vincent Brousseau, 2001. "Monetary policy and fears of financial instability," Working Paper Series 089, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rochet, Jean Charles & Vives, Xavier, 2002. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macroprudential concerns," Working Paper Series 205, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
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  6. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp737, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Toporowski , Jan, 2006. "Open market operations: beyond the new consensus," Research Discussion Papers 14/2006, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  8. David G. Mayes, 2004. "An approach to bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies," Finance 0404015, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 2001. "Financial Institutions, Contagious Risks, and Financial Crises," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 444, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  10. Charles A.E. Goodhart & Pojanart Sunirand & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, 2003. "A Model to Analyse Financial Fragility," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe13, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Tito Cordella y Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "A (New) Country Insurance Facility," Business School Working Papers newcountryins, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Fernando Ossa, 2003. "Los Bancos Centrales como Prestamistas de Última Instancia," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(120), pages 323-335. [Downloadable!]
  13. S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  14. Alina Carare & Mark R. Stone, 2003. "Inflation Targeting Regimes," IMF Working Papers 03/9, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Mark M. Spiegel, 2001. "Solvency runs, sunspot runs, and international bailouts," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 2001-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Erlenmaier, Ulrich & Gersbach, Hans, 2001. "The Funds Concentration Effect and Discriminatory Bailout," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  17. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 316, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Mark R. Stone, 2003. "Inflation Targeting Lite," IMF Working Papers 03/12, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  19. Jane Sneddon Little & Giovanni P. Olivei, 1999. "Why the interest in reforming the International Monetary System?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 53-84. [Downloadable!]
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