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Banking panics and policy responses

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  • Ennis, Huberto M.
  • Keister, Todd

Abstract

When policy makers have limited commitment power, self-fulfilling bank runs can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. We study how such banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. A run in this setting is necessarily partial, with only some depositors participating. In addition, a run naturally occurs in waves, with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further response from policy makers. In this way, the interplay between the actions of depositors and the responses of policy makers shapes the course of a crisis.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 57 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
Pages: 404-419

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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:57:y:2010:i:4:p:404-419

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

Related research

Keywords: Bank runs Limited commitment Time consistency Suspension of convertibility;

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jasmina Arifovic & Janet Hua Jiang, 2014. "Do Sunspots Matter? Evidence from an Experimental Study of Bank Runs," Working Papers 14-12, Bank of Canada.
  2. Cipriani, Marco & Martin, Antoine & McCabe, Patrick E. & Parigi, Bruno, 2014. "Gates, fees, and preemptive runs," Staff Reports 670, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  3. Vinogradov, Dmitri, 2012. "Destructive effects of constructive ambiguity in risky times," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1459-1481.
  4. Arifovic, Jasmina & Hua Jiang, Janet & Xu, Yiping, 2013. "Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2446-2465.
  5. Wen-Yao Grace Wang & Paula Hernandez-Verme & Raymond A. K. Cox Author E-mail: rcox@unbc.ca, 2012. "Financial Fragility, Exchange-Rate Regimes, and Sudden Stops in a Small Open Economy," Ekonomi-tek - International Economics Journal, Turkish Economic Association, vol. 1(3), pages 25-54, September.
  6. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 60-93, February.
  7. Li, Gan & Wen-Yao, Wang, 2010. "Partial Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard in Banking," MPRA Paper 25798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Pablo Kurlat, . "Optimal Stopping in a Model of Speculative Attacks," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Azrieli, Yaron & Peck, James, 2012. "A bank runs model with a continuum of types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 2040-2055.
  10. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2010. "On the fundamental reasons for bank fragility," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 1Q, pages 33-58.
  11. Matej Marinc & Razvan Vlahu, 2011. "The Economic Perspective of Bank Bankruptcy Law," DNB Working Papers 310, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  12. Todd Keister & Huberto Ennis, 2012. "Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility," 2012 Meeting Papers 179, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  13. Andrey Zubarev, 2013. "Russian Banking System: Stability Factors In the Wake of 2008-2009 Crisis," Working Papers 0049, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.
  14. Huang, Pidong, 2013. "Suspension in a Global-Games version of the Diamond-Dybvig model," MPRA Paper 46622, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Khandker, Shahidur R. & Koolwal, Gayatri B. & Haughtonm Jonathan & Jitsuchon, Somchai, 2012. "Household coping and response to government stimulus in an economic crisis : evidence from Thailand," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6016, The World Bank.
  16. Todd Keister, 2014. "Bailouts and Financial Fragility," Departmental Working Papers 201401, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  17. Todd Keister & Vijay Narasiman, 2011. "Expectations versus fundamentals: does the cause of banking panics matter for prudential policy?," Staff Reports 519, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  18. Todd Keister, 2010. "Bailouts and financial fragility," Staff Reports 473, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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