A discretionary policymaker responds to the state of the economy each period. Private agents' current behavior determines the future state based on expectations of future policy. Discretionary policy thus can lead to dynamic complementarity between private agents and a policymaker, which in turn can generate multiple equilibria. Working in a simple new Keynesian model with two-period staggered pricing in which equilibrium is unique under commitment we illustrate this interaction: if firms expect a high future money supply, (i) they will set a high current price and (ii) the future monetary authority will accommodate with a higher money supply, so as not to distort relative prices. We show that there are two point-in-time equilibria under discretion and we construct a related stochastic sunspot equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its series Working Paper with number
04-05.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Stefania Albanesi & V.V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano, .
"Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy,"
Working Papers
198, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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Aubhik Khan & Robert King & Alexander L. Wolman, 2002.
"Optimal monetary policy,"
Working Papers
02-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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Other versions:
Aubhik Khan & Robert G. King & Alexander L. Wolman, 2000.
"Optimal monetary policy,"
Working Paper
00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
[Downloadable!]
Aubhik Khan & Robert G. King & Alexander L. Wolman, 2001.
"Optimal monetary policy,"
Working Papers
01-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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Aubhik Khan & Robert G. King & Alexander L. Wolman, 2002.
"Optimal Monetary Policy,"
NBER Working Papers
9402, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Aubhik Khan & Robert G. King & Alexander L. Wolman, 2003.
"Optimal Monetary Policy,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(4), pages 825-860, October.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.