Huberto M. Ennis () (Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond) Todd Keister () (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM))
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
This paper introduces an approach to the study of optimal government policy in economies characterized by a coordination problem and multiple equilibria. Such models are often criticized as not being useful for policy analysis because they fail to assign a unique prediction to each possible policy choice. We employ a selection mechanism that assigns, ex ante, a probability to each equilibrium indicating how likely it is to obtain. We show how such a mechanism can be derived as the natural result of an adaptive learning process. This approach leads to a well-defined optimal policy problem, and has important implications for the conduct of government policy. We illustrate these implications using a simple model of technology adoption under network externalities.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM in its series Working Papers with number
0301.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Evans, George W & Honkapohja, Seppo, 1992.
"On the Robustness of Bubbles in Linear RE Models,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(1), pages 1-14, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003.
"Equilibrium Bank Runs,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Peck, James & Shell, Karl, 2001.
"Equilibrium Bank Runs,"
Working Papers
01-10r, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Marco Bassetto & Christopher Phelan, 2006.
"Tax riots,"
Working Paper Series
WP-06-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: