IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v154y2023ics0014292123000430.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Diamond–Dybvig and beyond: On the instability of banking

Author

Listed:
  • Gu, Chao
  • Monnet, Cyril
  • Nosal, Ed
  • Wright, Randall

Abstract

Are financial intermediaries – in particular, banks – inherently unstable or fragile, and if so, why? We address this theoretically by analyzing whether model economies with financial intermediation are more prone than those without it to multiple, cyclic, or stochastic equilibria. Several formalizations are considered: Insurance-based banking; models with reputational considerations; those with fixed costs and delegated investment; and those where bank liabilities serve as payment instruments. Importantly for the issue at hand, in each case banking arrangements arise endogenously. While the economics and mathematics differ across specifications, they all predict that financial intermediation engenders instability in a precise sense.

Suggested Citation

  • Gu, Chao & Monnet, Cyril & Nosal, Ed & Wright, Randall, 2023. "Diamond–Dybvig and beyond: On the instability of banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:154:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123000430
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104414
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292123000430
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104414?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Valerie R. Bencivenga & Bruce D. Smith, 1991. "Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 195-209.
    2. Nosal, Ed & Wong, Yuet-Yee & Wright, Randall, 2019. "Intermediation in markets for goods and markets for assets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 876-906.
    3. Andolfatto, David & Berentsen, Aleksander & Waller, Christopher, 2014. "Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 128-152.
    4. Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed & Wallace, Neil, 2007. "The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 709-715, November.
    5. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "The Aftermath of Financial Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 466-472, May.
    6. Auer, Raphael & Shin, Hyun Song & Monnet, Cyril, 2021. "Distributed Ledgers and the Governance of Money," CEPR Discussion Papers 16752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Green, Edward J. & Lin, Ping, 2003. "Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 1-23, March.
    8. Jonathan Chiu & Cesaire Meh & Randall Wright, 2017. "Innovation And Growth With Financial, And Other, Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(1), pages 95-125, February.
    9. Chao Gu & Fabrizio Mattesini & Cyril Monnet & Randall Wright, 2013. "Endogenous Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 940-965.
    10. Chiu, Jonathan & Meh, Césaire A., 2011. "Financial Intermediation, Liquidity, And Inflation," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(S1), pages 83-118, April.
    11. Quinn, Stephen, 1997. "Goldsmith-Banking: Mutual Acceptance and Interbanker Clearing in Restoration London," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 411-432, October.
    12. David Andolfatto & Fernando Martin, 2013. "Information Disclosure and Exchange Media," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(3), pages 527-539, July.
    13. John H. Boyd & Gianni De Nicolo & Bruce Smith, 2004. "Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 487-509.
    14. Luis Araujo & Raoul Minetti, 2011. "On The Essentiality Of Banks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(3), pages 679-691, August.
    15. Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, 2015. "Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10177-2.
    16. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Joseph H. Haslag & Antoine Martin, 2005. "Heterogeneity, Redistribution, And The Friedman Rule," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 437-454, May.
    17. Mark Gertler & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Andrea Prestipino, 2020. "A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(1), pages 240-288.
    18. Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Neil Wallace, 1999. "Inside and outside money as alternative media of exchange," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 443-468.
    19. Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti & Guillaume Plantin & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2007. "Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(2), pages 345-390.
    20. Haubrich, Joseph G., 1989. "Financial intermediation : Delegated monitoring and long-term relationships," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 9-20, March.
    21. Franklin Allen & Ansgar Walther, 2021. "Financial Architecture and Financial Stability," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 129-151, November.
    22. Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2005. "A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 463-484, June.
    23. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    24. Darrell Duffie, 2012. "Over-The-Counter Markets," Introductory Chapters, in: Dark Markets: Asset Pricing and Information Transmission in Over-the-Counter Markets, Princeton University Press.
    25. R. de O. Cavalcanti & P. K. Monteiro, 2016. "Enriching information to prevent bank runs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(3), pages 477-494, August.
    26. Peter M. DeMarzo & Michael J. Fishman, 2007. "Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(1), pages 151-188, January.
    27. Randall Wright, 2018. "On the future of macroeconomics: a New Monetarist perspective," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 34(1-2), pages 107-131.
    28. Sanches, Daniel & Williamson, Stephen, 2010. "Money and credit with limited commitment and theft," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1525-1549, July.
    29. Tri Vi Dang & Gary Gorton & Bengt Holmström & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2017. "Banks as Secret Keepers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(4), pages 1005-1029, April.
    30. Ricardo Lagos & Shengxing Zhang, 2020. "Turnover Liquidity and the Transmission of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(6), pages 1635-1672, June.
    31. Postlewaite, Andrew & Vives, Xavier, 1987. "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 485-491, June.
    32. Wallace, Neil, 2010. "The Mechanism-Design Approach to Monetary Theory," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 1, pages 3-23, Elsevier.
    33. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2009. "Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1588-1607, September.
    34. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2009. "Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1996-2020, September.
    35. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    36. Renee Courtois Haltom & Bruno Sultanum, 2018. "Preventing Bank Runs," Richmond Fed Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue March.
    37. Williamson, Stephen D, 1987. "Financial Intermediation, Business Failures, and Real Business Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1196-1216, December.
    38. Hongfei Sun & Stella Huangfu, 2011. "Private money and bank runs," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(3), pages 859-879, August.
    39. Mark Gertler & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, 2015. "Banking, Liquidity, and Bank Runs in an Infinite Horizon Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2011-2043, July.
    40. Ed Nosal & Yuet‐Yee Wong & Randall Wright, 2015. "More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(S2), pages 7-37, June.
    41. Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, 2005. "Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1293-1327, June.
    42. Yiting Li & Guillaume Rocheteau & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2012. "Liquidity and the Threat of Fraudulent Assets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 000.
    43. Jess Benhabib & Jianjun Miao & Pengfei Wang, 2016. "Chaotic banking crises and regulations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(2), pages 393-422, February.
    44. Tai-Wei Hu & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2015. "Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: A Mechanism Design Approach," Post-Print hal-04149210, HAL.
    45. Tai‐Wei Hu & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2015. "Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: A Mechanism Design Approach," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(S2), pages 39-76, June.
    46. Chao Gu & Fabrizio Mattesini & Randall Wright, 2016. "Money and Credit Redux," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1-32, January.
    47. Jonathan Chiu & Cesaire Meh & Randall Wright, 2017. "Innovation And Growth With Financial, And Other, Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58, pages 95-125, February.
    48. David Andolfatto & Aleksander Berentsen & Fernando M Martin, 2020. "Money, Banking, and Financial Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(5), pages 2049-2086.
    49. Douglas W. Diamond, 1996. "Financial intermediation as delegated monitoring: a simple example," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 51-66.
    50. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(4), pages 865-888.
    51. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    52. Guillaume Rocheteau & Randall Wright & Cathy Zhang, 2018. "Corporate Finance and Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(4-5), pages 1147-1186, April.
    53. Bethune, Zachary & Hu, Tai-Wei & Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2018. "Indeterminacy in credit economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 556-584.
    54. Bruce Champ & Bruce D. Smith & Stephen D. Williamson, 1996. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 828-864, November.
    55. Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, 1963. "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number frie63-1, March.
    56. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
    57. Neil Wallace, 1998. "A dictum for monetary theory," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 22(Win), pages 20-26.
    58. Mr. Haizhou Huang & Mr. C. A. E. Goodhart, 2000. "A Simple Model of An International Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 2000/075, International Monetary Fund.
    59. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005. "Has financial development made the world riskier?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 313-369.
    60. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2010. "Banking panics and policy responses," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 404-419, May.
    61. Gorton, Gary & Winton, Andrew, 2003. "Financial intermediation," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 431-552, Elsevier.
    62. Ricardo Lagos & Guillaume Rocheteau & Randall Wright, 2017. "Liquidity: A New Monetarist Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(2), pages 371-440, June.
    63. Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, 1986. "Inherent Instability in Banking: The Free Banking Experience," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(3), pages 877-890, Winter.
    64. Berentsen, Aleksander & Camera, Gabriele & Waller, Christopher, 2007. "Money, credit and banking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 171-195, July.
    65. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2003. "Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 220-245, April.
    66. Wallace, Neil, 2001. "Whither Monetary Economics?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 847-869, November.
    67. He, Ping & Huang, Lixin & Wright, Randall, 2008. "Money, banking, and monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 1013-1024, September.
    68. Zachary Bethune & Tai-Wei Hu & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2018. "Optimal Credit Cycles," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 27, pages 231-245, January.
    69. Benjamin Lester & Andrew Postlewaite & Randall Wright, 2012. "Information, Liquidity, Asset Prices, and Monetary Policy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(3), pages 1209-1238.
    70. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2001. "Banks and Liquidity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 422-425, May.
    71. Todd Keister, 2016. "Bailouts and Financial Fragility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 704-736.
    72. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1429-1445, November.
    73. C. A. E. Goodhart & H. Huang, 2000. "A Simple Model of an International Lender of Last Resort," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 29(1), pages 1-11, February.
    74. Cyril Monnet & Daniel R. Sanches, 2015. "Private Money and Banking Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(6), pages 1031-1062, September.
    75. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008. "Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262062704, December.
    76. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2010. "On the fundamental reasons for bank fragility," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 96(1Q), pages 33-58.
    77. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000077, UCLA Department of Economics.
    78. Hyman P. Minsky, 1992. "The Financial Instability Hypothesis," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_74, Levy Economics Institute.
    79. Chari, V V & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1988. " Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 749-761, July.
    80. Xavier Vives, 2016. "Competition and Stability in Banking: The Role of Regulation and Competition Policy," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10741.
    81. Zachary Bethune & Guillaume Rocheteau & Tsz-Nga Wong & Cathy Zhang, 2022. "Lending Relationships and Optimal Monetary Policy [A Comprehensive Revision of the U.S. Monetary Services (Divisia) Indexes]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(4), pages 1833-1872.
    82. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
    83. Edward J. Green & Ping Lin, 2000. "Diamond and Dybvig's classic theory of financial intermediation : what's missing?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 3-13.
    84. Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December.
    85. Gorton, Gary & Pennacchi, George, 1990. "Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 49-71, March.
    86. Chao Gu & Fabrizio Mattesini & Randall Wright, 2013. "Banking: A New Monetarist Approach," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 636-662.
    87. Neil Wallace, 1988. "Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking system: the Diamond and Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 12(Fall), pages 3-16.
    88. Gu, Chao, 2011. "Herding and bank runs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 163-188, January.
    89. Raphael Auer & Cyril Monnet & Hyun Song Shin, 2021. "Permissioned Distributed Ledgers and the Governance of Money," Diskussionsschriften dp2101, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    90. Luis Araujo & Leo Ferraris, 2020. "Money, Bonds, and the Liquidity Trap," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(7), pages 1853-1867, October.
    91. Ping He & Lixin Huang & Randall Wright, 2005. "Money And Banking In Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 637-670, May.
    92. Gu, Chao & Wright, Randall, 2016. "Monetary mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 644-657.
    93. Neil Wallace, 1990. "A banking model in which partial suspension is best," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 14(Fall), pages 11-23.
    94. Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Neil Wallace, 1999. "A model of private bank-note issue," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(1), pages 104-136, January.
    95. Cooper, Russell & Ross, Thomas W., 1998. "Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 27-38, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chao Gu & Cyril Monnet & Ed Nosal & Randall Wright, 2019. "On the Instability of Banking and Financial Intermediation," Working Papers 1901, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    2. Williamson, Stephen & Wright, Randall, 2010. "New Monetarist Economics: Models," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 2, pages 25-96, Elsevier.
    3. Chao Gu & Cyril Monnet & Ed Nosal & Randall Wright, 2019. "On the Instability of Banking and Other Financial Intermediation," Working Papers 19.04, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    4. Chao Gu & Fabrizio Mattesini & Randall Wright, 2013. "Banking: A New Monetarist Approach," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 636-662.
    5. Huberto Ennis & Todd Keister, 2016. "Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(2), pages 335-363, February.
    6. Guillaume Rocheteau & Randall Wright & Cathy Zhang, 2018. "Corporate Finance and Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(4-5), pages 1147-1186, April.
    7. Stephen D. Williamson & Randall Wright, 2010. "New monetarist economics: methods," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 92(May), pages 265-302.
    8. Matsuoka, Tarishi & Watanabe, Makoto, 2019. "Banking crises and liquidity in a monetary economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    9. Tarishi Matsuoka & Makoto Watanabe, 2017. "Banking Panics and Liquidity in a Monetary Economy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-091/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    10. Sultanum, Bruno, 2018. "Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 616-658.
    11. Chao Gu & Fabrizio Mattesini & Randall Wright, 2016. "Money and Credit Redux," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1-32, January.
    12. Todd Keister, 2016. "Bailouts and Financial Fragility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 704-736.
    13. Keister, Todd & Mitkov, Yuliyan, 2023. "Allocating losses: Bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    14. Todd Keister & Huberto M. Ennis, 2007. "Commitment and Equilibrium Bank Runs," 2007 Meeting Papers 509, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Daniel R. Sanches, 2014. "Banking panics and protracted recessions," Working Papers 14-37, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    16. Gao, Jiahong & Reed, Robert R., 2021. "Sunspot bank runs and fragility: The role of financial sector competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    17. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2010. "Banking panics and policy responses," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 404-419, May.
    18. Jiahong Gao & Robert R. Reed, 2023. "Preventing bank panics: The role of the regulator's preferences," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(2), pages 387-422, May.
    19. Todd Keister & Vijay Narasiman, 2016. "Expectations vs. Fundamentals- driven Bank Runs: When Should Bailouts be Permitted?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 21, pages 89-104, July.
    20. Kinateder, Markus & Kiss, Hubert János, 2014. "Sequential decisions in the Diamond–Dybvig banking model," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 149-160.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking; Financial intermediation; Instability; Volatility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:154:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123000430. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.